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INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY

Many have told the story of the development of western water
law based on appropriation of usufructuary rights.' In brief,
settlers crossing the 100th Meridian found an arid country

completely unlike the humid and well-watered lands of the
American East and the British Isles. 2 In response to these
rejected the communal-use riparian
conditions of scarcity, settlers
3

rules of the lands of plenty.

Instead, the settlers developed a system in which individuals
could claim the use of water flows as property, and could divert
such flows from natural courses for their private purposes.4 The
See, e.g., 1 WELLS A. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN
WESTERN STATES 159-65 (1971); 1 SAMUEL C. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE
WESTERN STATES 65-117 (3d ed. 1911); Norman K. Johnson & Charles T.
DuMars, A Survey of the Evolution of Western Water Law in Response to
Changing Economic and Public Interest Demands, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 347,
347-56 (1989); Christine A. Klein, The ConstitutionalMythology of Western
Water Law, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 343, 343-52 (1995); Anthony Scott & Georgina
Coustalin, The Evolution of Water Rights, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 821 passim
(1995).

See, e.g., Reed D. Benson, Whose Water Is It? Private Rights and Public

2

Authority Over Reclamation Project Water, 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 363, 363 (1997)
(citing U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ACREAGE LIMITATION AND WATER
CONSERVATION RULES AND REGULATIONS: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, ch. 3, at 2, 45 (1996)); Scott & Coustalin, supra note 1, at 903-04.
3 See, e.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 504 n.2
(1945); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 704
(1899); Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo.443, 446-49 (1882); State v. Sw.
Colo. Water Conservation Dist., 671 P.2d 1294, 1305 (Colo. 1983).
4 See, e.g., Boquillas Land & Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 89 P. 504, 508 (Ariz.
1907) (Kent, C.J., concurring) ("Great property rights have become established
upon a different theory [than riparianism]. The physical conditions and the
demands of agriculture and mining are utterly inconsistent with its
applicability."), affid, 213 U.S. 339 (1909); Coffin, 6 Colo, at 449 ("[T]he
disastrous consequences of our adoption of the [riparian] rule.., forbid our
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basic rule of this new system, often generically known as "prior
appropriation," was that "[t]he person who is first in time to
appropriate water is the first in right" to use it.5 Private uses had to
be beneficial; non-beneficial use or non-use was waste subject to
forfeit. 6 The amount of water appropriable for a given use was set
by water "duties" based on the amount of water generally required
for the proposed use, up to the amount of water available for
appropriation.7 Use was not appurtenant to riparian land.8 By
comparison, in riparian jurisdictions, owners of land bordering a
water body (riparian owners) enjoy certain use rights as
appurtenances to their land ownership. Riparian owners' uses of
water must be "reasonable" relative to the actual and potential uses
of all other riparian owners, and must be adjusted to ensure
equivalent access by all other riparian users. Earlier uses receive
no priority over later uses. Uses on riparian lands and within
original watersheds receive priority over other uses.9
The western polities embraced the new prior-appropriation
system. It developed first as local custom, and subsequently in the
common-raw of the new territories, 10 and was eventually enshrined
in initial state constitutions." It was reduced to system by statute

as claims, settlements, and need for the available water
giving such a construction to the statutes."); see also sources cited supra note 1.
2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 12.01, at 12-2 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991
ed., repl. vol. 2000); see also id. § 12.02(e), at 12-56; Klein, supra note 1, at
347-48; Scott & Coustalin, supra note 1, at 914.
6 See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 5, § 12.02(b), at 12-8; id. §
12.02(c)(2), at 12-28.
' See id. § 17.03(d), at 17-18 to 17-19. See also Conrow v. Huffine, 138 P.
1094, 1096-97 (Mont. 1914); Foster v. Foster, 213 P. 895, 896-98 (Or. 1923);
Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1049 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
8 See generally 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 5, § 12.02(f), at
12-64 to 12-68.
9 See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 5, § 6.01(a).
•10See, e.g., United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 51 P. 674,
678 (N.M. 1898) ("The law of prior appropriation existed under the Mexican
republic at the time of the acquisition of New Mexico . . ."), rev'd, 174 U.S. 690
(1889); Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882) ("[T]he...
doctrine has existed from the date of the earliest appropriations of water within
the boundaries of the state."); Nielson v. Parker, 115 P. 488, 490 (Idaho 1911)
("The doctrine prevailed prior to statehood, and in the earliest territorial
history ....).
1' See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 13; ARIZ. CONST. art. XVII, §§ 1-2;
COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5-6; IDAHO CONST. art. XV, § 3; MONT. CONST. art.
IX, § 3; NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 5-6; N.M. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 1-3; UTAH
CONST. art. XVII, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.

Imaged withHeinOnline
Permission
N.Y.U.
Environmental
-- 17from
N.Y.U.
Envtl. L.J.
1065 2008-2009Law Journal

1066

N.Y. U. ENVIRONMENTAL LA WJOURNAL

[Volume 17

multiplied. 12 The federal government repeatedly and consistently

acceded to the new water regime in these states. 13 As the U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized, that
accession has long-since
4
become obligatory and irrevocable.1
These constitutional and statutory acts enshrining western

water law were clear: the water rights created were, though
usufructuary rights (i.e., ownership of the use of the flow of the
water, rather than ownership of any individual molecules of
water), nevertheless genuine property rights. 15 Because these
12 See,

e.g., Act of Apr. 13, 1893, no. 86, 1893 Ariz. Sess. Laws 135; Act of
Feb. 11, 1881, 1881 Colo. Sess. Laws 161; Act of Feb. 28, 1881, ch. 142, 1881
Dakota Sess. Laws 226; Act of Mar. 16, 1899, ch. 97, 1899 Nev. Stat. 115; Act
of Feb. 26, 1891, ch. 71, 1891 N.M. Laws 130; Act of Mar. 12, 1897, ch. 19,
1897 Okla. Sess. Laws 187; Act of Mar. 19, 1889, ch. 88, 1889 Tex. Gen. Laws
100; Act of Mar. 11, 1886, ch. 61, 1886 Wyo. Sess. Laws 294. See also 1
HUTCHINS, supra note 1, at 438-40 (collecting statutes). Beneficial uses tended
to be defined by statute (though sometimes constitutionally or judicially); see,
e.g., 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 5, § 12(c)(2), at 12-27 to 12-41.
13 See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act § 101(g), 33
U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2000) (enacted in 1948); 43 U.S.C. § 321 (2000) (originally
enacted as Desert Land Act of 1877, ch. 107, § 1, 19 Stat. 337); 43 U.S.C. §§
372, 383 (2000) (originally enacted as Reclamation Act of 1902, Ch. 1093, § 8,
32 Stat. 390); 43 U.S.C. § 661 (2000) (originally enacted as Mining Act of 1866,
ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 253); 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2000) (originally enacted as
McCarran Amendment of 1952, ch. 651, tit. II, § 208(a)-(c), 66 Stat. 560); see
also California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 674-79 (1978).
14 See, e.g., California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.,
295 U.S. 142, 155, 162 (1935); Rio Grande Dam, 174 U.S. at 702-06; Broder v.
Water Co., 101 U.S. 274, 276 (1879) (describing western water rights as "rights
which the government had, by its conduct, recognized and encouraged and was
bound to protect"). Getches claims that federal accession is a "myth" because
Rio Grande Dam includes reservations of continuing federal authority. David H.
Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy: Have FederalLaws and
Local Decisions Eclipsed the States' Role?, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 6-7 (2001).

Taken together, however, the two reservations serve only to "vest[] in that
[g]overnment the right to take all needed measures to preserve the navigability of
the navigable water courses of the country even against any state action." Rio
Grande Dam, 174 U.S. at 703. But the federal navigation servitude, while real,
cannot be bootstrapped into plenary authority to federalize water law. See infra
Part I.B-C.
1" See, e.g., 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 1, at 441-43 ("[The] right of diversion
and use.., is a usufructuary right... a right of possession and use only... and
hence it does not include an ownership of the corpus of water while still in the
natural source of supply."); 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 5, §
12.02(e), at 12-56. Pragmatically, the important principle is that private
ownership of stream water while in its natural environment does not exist; but
private rights to abstract and use such waters-under state supervision and
control in the exercise of its police powers--do exist, and they are property
rights.
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states, not to mention the federal government, also provided (and
provide) constitutional protection against government taking of
property rights for public purposes without compensation, the
water rights the states had created were compensation-protected
rights as well.
Beginning in the 1970s, however, many scholars have
attempted to defeat the presumption that compensation obligations
apply to these water rights. These scholars' various motives have
included concerns that private water rights pose an unacceptable
challenge to environmental protection and efficient use, that justice
forbids private rights in water, and that water by its very nature is
unamenable to private ownership. Their task, though, is not an
easy one. As a leader of the effort has long acknowledged, "[f]rom
a constitutional perspective all property rights have exactly the
same status."'1 6 That status is one of compensation for government
takings.17 Thus, to justify taking water rights without payment,
proponents of the compensation-denying position must
demonstrate that, despite all evidence and reasonable presumption
to the contrary, water fights .are something different than property
rights.
In Section I, I review the various efforts to undermine the
compensable property-right status of water rights. These efforts
include claims based on the ancient and federal public trust
doctrines, other federal doctrines, and various aspects of state
water law (sometimes aggregated under the label "state public trust
doctrine"). I conclude that none of these efforts succeeds. Ancient
rules and practices governing the ownership and use of waterways
and water provide no support for the non-compensation position.
The federal public trust doctrine either is silent on the issue or,
along with the Fifth Amendment, affirmatively obliges
compensation for vested water rights. Other federal doctrines also
fail to support the compensation-stripping proposition.
16 Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of Water
Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 260 (1990) [hereinafter Sax, Constitution]
("Insofar as 'there appears to be a broadly held view that a water right is a
special kind of property right which cannot be regulated in the same manner as
other property rights,' a simple response can be given: that view is wrong."
(citation omitted)).
17 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."); 2A JULIUS L. SACKMAN & PATRICK J.
ROHAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.0111] (Supp. 1997) (collecting state-

level provisions).
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State statutory and common law provide similarly scant
assistance. Because western water-law systems, including water
rights, have state-constitutional roots and protections, coeval
constitutional provisions must be read, if possible, not to obviate
the water-right provisions and their property protections. As I
demonstrate, such a consistent reading is straightforwardly
available, and it is therefore obliged. This robs the noncompensation position of a state-constitutional hook, while
confirming the compensation-protected status of the water rights.
This in turn disables claims that state statutes or common-law
doctrine (which must be read in conformance with constitutional
mandate) can do the work of denying property status to the water
rights. As a result, no defenses to compensation arise from state
law, either--or at least none consistent with the integrity of, and
the rules of construction inherent in, the American constitutional
system. 18
(Famously, California alone has adopted an interpretation of
its state public trust doctrine that seems to permit taking of water
rights without compensation for public trust purposes. 19
California's water law, however, is unique: it continues to
recognize riparian rights alongside of and co-equal to prior-.
appropriation rights, and its law is contoured by a .1928
constitutional amendment that has been interpreted to qualify
water rights in ways that have no counterpart in the other priorappropriation states.2° Much confusion and misunderstanding has
arisen in the scholarly literature, particularly with regard to the
actual and potential scope of state-level public trust doctrines in
western states other than California, because scholars have
conflated California's singular situation and doctrine with that of
IS Eight states, the most arid of the Rocky Mountain West, constitute the hard

core of western water-law jurisdiction, where riparian water rights have been
effectively extinguished. These are Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. In the remaining states, each of which

contains both less- and more-arid sections, riparian rights remain in
subordination to, or by incorporation into, the prior-appropriation system. These
are: Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,
Washington, and to a lesser extent Alaska and Texas. 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 1,
1-3, 14-17, 192-99.
19 See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 727 (Cal.

1983).

20 See CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; Douglas L. Grant, Western Water Rights and
the Public Trust Doctrine: Some Realism About the Takings Issue, 27 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 423, 461-62 (1995).
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western states generally.21 California's novel circumstances and
development require independent consideration; this article's
scope extends to western water-law states other than California.)
Compensation, then, must be paid upon taking of western
water rights. In Section II I show how these taking obligations fit
into modem physical-takings jurisprudence without altering that
jurisprudence.
As noted, the compensation-denial argument arose in large
part from scholarly attempts to render western water law more
responsive to increasing scarcity and multiplying ecological
concerns.
This position essentially treats water rights and
ecological values as competitors, and favors elimination of water
rights in purported aid of the environment. In Section III I address
these public-policy claims, as well as related claims that both
considerations of justice and of the nature of water itself militate
against private water rights. I conclude that, contra these claims,
each of these considerations support respecting, clarifying, and
strengthening defensible water rights and favor 'straightforward
application of eminent-domain rules to such rights. In practical
fact, pitting environmental protection against preservation of
property fights turns a potential ally of ecological interests into an
inevitable foe. Destroying the water right, meanwhile, will rob
ecological-preservation interests of an important tool for
preserving water for ecologically dedicated uses. It will purchase
a short-term increase in water available for environmental use at
the cost of long-term transfer of underpriced water to subsidize
additional urban development, and of injustice to current waterright holders who lack the political power to fight uncompensated
taking of their water rights.
Given these considerations, it is not surprising that
compensation-denying theories have received such short shrift in
the real world. Only the California courts, under the unique
circumstances mentioned above, have articulated a doctrine
permitting uncompensated water-right taking-and that fully a
21 See, e.g., 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 33.03, at 33-16 to 33-17
(Robert E. Beck ed., 2003); Brian E. Gray, The Property Right in Water, 9
HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 12-17 (2002) (recognizing

California's peculiar jurisprudence while nevertheless considering water rights in
general terms); Joseph L. Sax, Rights that "Inhere in the Title Itself': The
Impact of the Lucas Case on Western Water Law, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 943,
951-53 (1993) [hereinafter Sax, Rights that Inhere].
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quarter-of-a-century ago.22 It is time to recognize that attempts to
preserve ecological values by eviscerating water rights are
incoherent and unwise. Section IV, therefore, proposes a modest
plan of action for western states designed to respect constitutional
rights, maximize efficient use of water resources, and ensure that
water remains available to serve reasonable ecological goals in the
face of ever-increasing demands on water by ever-burgeoning
western-state populations. States should renounce any pretence to
uncompensated-taking authority, establish ecological-use water
trusts of a quasi-private nature, and arm these or co-ordinate public
agencies with both eminent-domain power and the power to
negotiate agreements freeing extant water rights from various
alienation-and-use restrictions.
I. ANALYSIS OF ASSERTED DEFENSES TO COMPENSATION
Scholars have proposed a wide variety of defenses to the
formation of valid and compensable water rights in the western
water law system. The effort began four decades ago, when
Professor Joseph Sax proposed 23 a wide-ranging modem public
trust doctrine, based loosely on his interpretations of the'content of
ancient and federal public trust doctrines, that would "contain
some concept of a legal right in the general public," be
"enforceable against the government," and "be capable of an
interpretation consistent with contemporary concerns for
environmental quality., 24 Sax imagined an expansive scope for
the doctrine.
"Public trust problems are found whenever
government regulation comes into question, and they occur in a
wide range of situations in which diffuse public interests need
protection against tightly organized groups with clear and
immediate goals. 2 5 This included "controversies involving air
pollution, the dissemination of pesticides, the location of rights of
22

See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 727.

23 Sax's exposition of the doctrine was ostensibly partially positive, based in

the various public trust cases he cited. Yet he treated isolated cases from
scattered jurisdictions as dispositive explications of the general "American"
public trust doctrine, and he significantly departed from any positive description
of the historical doctrine in his proposal for an expanded public trust doctrine.
See Sax, Rights that Inhere, supra note 21 passim; infra Part I.D.
24 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 474 (1970) [hereinafter
Sax, NaturalResource Law].
25 Id. at 556.

N.Y.U.
Environmental
Imaged withHeinOnline
Permission
-- 17from
N.Y.U.
Envtl. L.J.
1070 2008-2009Law Journal

2009]

UNBEARABLE COST OF SKIPPING THE CHECK

way for utilities, and strip mining or wetland filling on private
lands, 26 but also non-environmental issues such as those
"affecting the poor and consumer groups." 27 And though the
proposed scope was sweeping, the doctrine's proposed effect was,
in its 1970 explication, relatively limited. It would permit courts
to take a "hard look" at transactions falling within the doctrine,28
but clear legislative and executive action, as well as constitutional
dictate, could not be thwarted. 29 Additionally, Sax sidestepped the

takings implications of his proposal, noting that "the courts can
limit their intervention
to regulation which stops short of a
30
compensable taking."

Within a decade, though, Sax sought a more aggressive role
for his doctrine, 31 and within two he had asserted that one of the
effects of his proposed doctrine was that it, combined with or
subsuming related doctrines and traditions, rendered
water rights
32
unamenable to takings-compensation protection.
26 Id. at 556-57.

27 Id. at 557.

28 See id. at 486 ("[C]ourts [would] not look kindly upon such grants and
[would] usually interpret them quite restrictively, and apply a more rigorous
standard than is used to analyze conveyances by private parties."); see also Carol
M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351,
355 (1998) ("In particular, in his 1970 Public Trust Doctrine article, Sax
effectively treated the public trust as a common-law version of the then-novel
'hard look' doctrine for environmental impacts. According to Sax's analysis, the
public trust doctrine required the collection of adequate information, public
participation in decisions, informed and accountable choices, and close scrutiny
of private giveaways of environmental resources.").
29 See, e.g., Sax, Natural Resource Law, supra note 24, at 482-83
& n.36.
Sax recognized that allocations of property or designations of property status
made in state constitutions could be countermanded only by repeal of the
constitutional provision.
30 Id. at 557.
31 See Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine From its
HistoricalShackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 185, 185-86 (1980) [hereinafter Sax,
Liberating].
32 See Sax, Constitution, supra note 16, at 269 (claiming that "water's
capacity for full privatization has always been limited" and "in demanding
releases to meet instream flow needs, a state is only asserting a right it has
always had and never granted away"); Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private
Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENVTL. L. 473, 475 (1989) [hereinafter Sax, Limits
of Private Rights] (claiming that public trust and pollution doctrines deny water
compensability protections). This position partly unpacked statements about
water law that Sax first included in his 1970 piece. See Sax, Natural Resource
Law, supra note 24, at 485; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Compensation and the
Interconnectedness of Property, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 327, 333-34, 341 (1998)
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The central and unambiguous message [of the "modern" public
trust doctrine Sax had propounded] is that water is and always
has been a public resource. The law is that water flows to
benefit those uses that advance the contemporary public
interest. No private right may stand in the way of that flux and
reflux of water rights. Since the public interest, as now
perceived, demands the retention and augmentation of instream water supplies, that is the way the water is going to
flow. Property rights secured under the prior appropriation
system will not be able
to resist this basic limitation on the
33
privatization of water.

In other words, appropriative water rights simply are not
property rights-and as such, may be taken by government without
compensation. "Rights" holders "were not.., being vested with a
private property right that could be asserted against [the public]
interest when public goals changed. They obtained a right because
they were making a use that was at the time compatible with the
public interest. Their water right extended only as far as that
compatibility. 3 4
Many scholars in the field embraced this compensationdenying position.3 5 They have alternatively relied on ancient and
federal public trust doctrines, other federal doctrines and
jurisprudence, state constitutional provisions, the usufructuary
nature of water rights, common-law doctrine, and generalized
recourse to claimed public-policy considerations. 36 Sometimes
(noting that while Sax's theories and justifications change, his opposition to
corpensation remains constant).
See Sax, Limits of PrivateRights, supra note 32, at 475.
34 See id. at 476.
35 See infra passim for citations to scholarly treatments supporting or
accepting claim.
3 The scholars do not consistently define these different defenses, or the
doctrines and other edifices upon which they rely, in the same way. In particular,
the concept of "public trust doctrine" gets employed in a wide variety of
inconsistent (if not somewhat mutually exclusive) ways, and the foundations and
support for the doctrine are often divergent, unclear or unexplained. See, e.g.,
Rose, supra note 28, at 354-60 (detailing the "generalized," "vague," and
indistinct or undefined use of the concept); see also Michael C. Blumm & Thea
Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 37 ARIZ.
L. REv. 701, 708-09, 713-15 (1995) (considering variety of sources); James L.
-Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional
Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527, 552-555 (1989); John D. Leshy, A Conversation
About Takings and Water Rights, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1985, 1999 (2005); Sax,
Rights that Inhere, supra note 21, at 950-51; Joseph L. Sax, PropertyRights and
the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
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they have followed Sax in wrapping these claims together under
the heading of a modem public trust doctrine. However they are
packaged, though, none of these claimed bases supports the
conclusion that compensable rights in water (a) cannot be formed;
(b) have not been formed; or (c) may be stripped of takingscompensation protection despite their valid formation. It must be
concluded, therefore, that western states successfully created
water-property rights that enjoy takings-compensation protection.
A.

The Ancient Public Trust Doctrines

Both Roman and English law unsurprisingly included
provisions concerning ownership and use of natural resources in
various circumstances, including water. Although Sax, in his 1970
article, recognized that "only the most manipulative of historical
readers could extract much binding precedent from what happened
a few centuries ago in England,, 37 much less millennia ago in
Rome, both he and other non-compensation advocates nevertheless
frequently invoke English and Roman legal tradition, and their
38
rhetorical force, to support the compensation-denial position.
Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433, 1452-53 (1993) [hereinafter Sax, Property &
Economy]; Sax, Constitution,supra note 16, at 280; Sax, NaturalResource Law,
supra note 24, at 475-76, 484-86; George P. Smith II & Michael W. Sweeney,
The Public Trust Doctrine and NaturalLaw: Emanations Within a Penumbra, 33
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 307, 313 (2006). For clarity and concision, therefore,
this article: (a) refers to ancient Roman and English rules of ownership and use
of waterways as, generally, the "ancient public trust doctrine"; (b) draws from
U.S. Supreme Court precedent a specific definition of the federal public trust
doctrine and employs it accordingly, reviewing distinct federal doctrine in
separate terms; and (c) eschews any attempt to articulate a comprehensive theory
of a state-law public trust doctrine per se, instead reviewing each possible
location of and basis for such a doctrine (or other propounded compensationstripping device) on its own terms. Cf Sax, Natural Resource Law, supra note
24, at 485 ("Certainly the phrase 'public trust' does not contain any magic such
that special obligations can be said to arise merely from its incantation .... ).
37 Sax, NaturalResource Law, supra note 24, at 485. Similarly,
in 1980 Sax
called for "liberating the public trust doctrine from its historical shackles,"
asserting that "neither Roman Law nor the English experience with lands
underlying tidal waters is the place to search for the core of the trust idea." Sax,
Liberating, supra note 31, at 185-86. Sax suggested that "the tradition of the
commons in medieval Europe" provides "the proper sources for the legal public
trust doctrine today," but without explaining how "regional French law in the
1 1 h century" plays any role in American jurisprudence. Id. at 189. Additionally,
the legal rule he cited asserted a right common in individuals to use the relevant
public resources-not a governmental right to exclude all users or capture the
resource for its own uses.
38 Even by raising the ghosts of the ancient doctrines (and calling his theory
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In reality, however, neither the Roman nor the English rules
governing ownership and use of water or other natural resources
provide any legitimate foundation, real or rhetorical, for the notion
that property rights cannot be created in such resources. In fact,
property rights to water, including flowing Water, existed in both
regimes.
The ancient doctrine was not a blanket rule applying to all

natural, or water, resources. Even the short-hand and essentially
aspirational treatise statements of Roman and English law that are
often cited as full expositions of the ancient law make no claims
about universal applicability to water or to natural resources
generally. 39 Rather, these sources claim as "common to mankind"
"the public trust doctrine,") Sax and his supporters have attempted to associate
the new strategy with the old rules-without, however, considering deeply the
specifics of those rules. See Sax, Natural Resource Law, supra note 24, at 48485. See also Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 36, at 713, 737; Jane Maslow
Cohen, Of Waterbanks, Piggybanks, and Bankruptcy: Changing Directions in
Water Law-Foreword, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1809, 1851-52 (2005); Leshy, supra
note 36, at 1998-99; Rose, supra note 28, at 351, 355; Sax, Constitution,supra
note 16, at 269-71; Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient
PrerogativeBecomes the People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
195, 195-198 (1980); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwatersof the Public Trust:
Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the TraditionalDoctrine, 19 ENVTL.
L. 425, 425-31 (1989). This is because the specifics do not support the position.
See infra this section; see also Huffman, supra note 36, at 549 ("By linking the
flexibility of constitutional interpretation with the deep historical roots of the
public trust doctrine, it is possible to manufacture new rights while claiming
simply to uphold existing rights.").
39 See

THE

INSTITUTES

OF

JUSTINIAN:

TEXT,

TRANSLATION

AND

COMMENTARY 65, §§ 2.1.1-2.1.5 (J A C Thomas ed. & trans., North-Holland
Publishing Company 1975), cited in Sax, Natural Resource Law, supra note 24,
at 475 n.15, and Stevens, supra note 38, at 197 n.7. The Institutes were a portion
of the Corpus Juris Civilis, a legal code in "four main parts: the Institutes, a
brief, elementary textbook of law intended for the use of law students, but having
the force of law; the Digest (or Pandects), a 50-volume codification of the legal
writings of the great Roman jurists; the Code (or Codex), a collection of imperial
enactments; and the Novels, a collection of imperial legislation enacted after the
Code was promulgated." Glenn J. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the
Civil and Common Law: Historical Development, Current Importance, and
Some Doctrines that Don't Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 511, 518 (1975).
As the Digest reveals, the Institutes' summary is a misleading statement of actual
Roman law. In developing what has been called "England's first 'general
treatise' on law," Henry Bracton relied heavily on selected Roman sourcesincluding this section of the Institutes-to craft a normative statement of the
general law as he favored it. See MacGrady, supra, at 555-56 (citing I HENRY
BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (Samuel E. Thorne trans.,
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1968); STUART A. MOORE, A
HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO

31-33 (1888));

N.Y.U.
Environmental
Imaged withHeinOnline
Permission
-- 17from
N.Y.U.
Envtl. L.J.
1074 2008-2009Law Journal

2009]

UNBEARABLE COST OF SKIPPING THE CHECK

1075

only "running water, air, the4 0sea, and the shores of the sea, as
though accessories of the sea."
Neither did the ancient doctrine apply to water per se. As the
treatise statement above suggests, the "running water" referred to

is not water qua water, but rather waterways, insofar as they
participate in a relation with the seas, as common-carrier
highways. 4 1 The details of Roman and English law confirm this

interpretation: in both, larger waterways were (in some senses)
public, while smaller waterways were effectively private. (This
distinction corresponds roughly with the modem American notion
of "navigability.

43)

Thus, for instance, at Roman law none could

"do anything in a public river 'whereby the landing or the
navigation is made worse'; do anything in a public river 'whereby
the water is made to flow otherwise than as during the summer
before' (i.e. to divert the boundaries of the watercourse); or do
violence to anyone 'who is doing a work in the public river...
with the lawful purpose of protecting the banks.' ' 44 Similarly,
English law forbade erection of permanent fishing structures that

interfered with navigation. 45 Notably, non-watercourse waters
James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentageof the Equal Footing
and Public Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REv. 1, 9 (1997). As with the
Institutes, Bracton's treatise differed significantly from actual English practice.
40 BRACTON, supra note 39, at 39-40; see also INSTITUTES, supra note 39, §
2.1.1.
41 Some sympathetic to compensation-denial have obliquely recognized this
incongruity, though without pursuing the ramifications of this and related
disconnects. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private
Property,Public Rights, and the New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 265, 270 (1996) ("The use of waterways, for example, has been considered
a public property right since the time of the Romans and, to a lesser degree, so
have fisheries." (emphasis added)); Smith & Sweeney, supra note 36, at 310
("[The Institutes] articulated the 'nearly universal notion' that watercourses
should be protected from complete private acquisition in order to preserve the
lifelines of communal existence." (emphasis added)). Authors less disposed to
the theory have similarly noted the problem. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The
Public Trust Doctrine,7 CATO J. 411, 415-16 (1987); Barton H. Thompson, The
Public Trust Doctrine: A ConservativeReconstruction & Defense, 15 SE. ENVTL.
L.J. 47, 56-57 (2006).
42 MacGrady, supra note 39, at 520 (quoting DIGEST §§ 43.12.1.1 to 43.12.3
translated in EUGENE F. WARE, ROMAN WATER LAW 33-56 (1905)); id. at 581
(quoting Lord Fitzwalter's Case, (1674) 86 Eng. Rep. 766-67 (K.B.), and The
Royal Fishery of the Banne, (1610) 80 Eng. Rep. 540-41 (K.B.)).
43 See MacGrady, supra note 39, at 520, 528-30, 581.
44 Id. at 521 (citing DIGEST, supra note 42, §§ 43.12.1 to 43.15.1).
45 Id. at 571 ("Apparently, the streams of England, both tidal and nontidal,
were being choked by kydells, weirs, and other fishing devices; and originally
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were not implicated at all-as presumably they would be were the
doctrine about water rather than waterways.
Thus, waterways were not universally public: only commoncarrier highways were to some extent public. Even the "public"
waterways were not public in the government-control manner
contemplated by modem theorists.46 They were owned in
common, available for use by all.47 This kind of control is as little
akin to state control as to private, and provides as little
precedential support for the former as the latter.
The ancient doctrine provides no support for claims that no
private rights in water may be asserted against the public. 49 As has
been seen, water qua water was not implicated by the doctrine.
But even for those things that were implicated, there were no
the complaint voiced against the kydells... was they interfered with
navigation."); see also id. at 572 n.315 (citing MOORE, supra note 39, at 151-52
(quoting a statue of 25 Edward III: A.D. 1351, requiring the removal of
navigation-inhibiting fish-catching devices)).
46 The Roman terms for the concept of state-owned property were res
publicae and res universitatis. This differed from res communes, which
described property common to all, that all could access free of constraint by
government or other individuals. See MacGrady, supra note 39, at 518 (citing
INSTITUTES, supra note 39, §§ 2.1.1-2.1.10); see also Lloyd R. Cohen, The
Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL.W. L. REv. 239, 250
(1992).
47 See MacGrady, supra note 39, at 524 (quoting W. W. BUCKLAND,
A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 185 (2d ed. 1932) ("As to
rivers themselves the texts contain differences of opinion as to the sense in which
they are public.")); id. at 525 (describing the possibilities of ownership by the
state, by private owners, or in common); id. at 527 n.70 ("The use of public
streams is common to all, just the same as public roads and the shores of the
sea." (quoting DIGEST, supra note 42, § 39.2.24)); Huffman, supra note 36, at
540 ("What the English courts and authorities relied upon was, the Roman law
distinction between res communes and res publicae, the former being rights held
by the public and the latter being proprietary interests of the state."); id. at 54445, 550.
48 See Huffman, supra note 36, at 550 ("Individuals navigated and fished the
tidal waters of England, and individuals objected when the Crown precluded
them from those waters. Clause 33 of the Magna Carta was a limit on the
monarch's ability to monopolize for himself or his favorites the benefits of the
tidal waters."); see also Cohen, supra note 46, at 244 (describing three possible
kinds of ownership or control: private, collective, and communal).
49 See, e.g., Sax, Limits of Private Rights, supra note 32, at 475-76 (asserting
that "water is and always has been a public resource" such that "[n]o private
right may stand in the way," and observing that, at the time when water use to
promote industrialization was considered a "primary public goal," private
interests were not vested "with a private property right that could be asserted
against that [public] interest").
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absolute rules against private ownership and use. For instance, the
sea shores-named explicitly as a "public trust" property by the
treatise writer-were in fact very broadly privately owned.50 The
same was true of other explicitly trust-concerned properties.51
Moreover, claims that arose in England to the contrary (i.e.,
challenging private ownership of the foreshore) were not claims
that the foreshores must be publicly owned, but rather claims of a
rebuttable presumption, absent strong proof of private ownership,
that the lands were in the Crown-a doctrine devised by the
Crown to seize lands it had previously granted or sold, so as- to
allow resale and revenue generation. 2 (Notably, this course of
conduct-of.employing a legal fiction as an excuse for seizing the
vested property of private parties for state use-eventually resulted
in one of the charges levied against Charles I that cost him his
throne and his head. 53)
The law that actually applied to water qua water similarly
permitted private rights. At Roman law, waters not running in a
watercourse were subject to privatization; 54 waters running in
private watercourses were private; 55 and waters running in public
watercourses were available for anyone to take and to reduce to
private use, so long as the taking did not affect the common-carrier
nature of the waterway.5 6 Likewise in English law, fishing and

water use were private rights in private waterways; in public
waters, they were common rights, so long as they did not interfere
with navigation. 57 Private water rights were not amenable to
'o See MacGrady, supra note 39, at 555-68.

51 See Cohen, supra note 46, at 250; Rasband, supra note 39, at 21-33.
52 MacGrady, supra note 39, at 557-68; Rasband, supra note 39, at 11-14.

There was never any suggestion that parliament was barred from selling off or
otherwise erecting private rights in "trust properties." See, e.g., Cohen, supra
note 46, at 274.
53 MacGrady, supra note 39, at 562 (citing MOORE, supra note 39, at 176).
54 See Cohen, supra note 46, at 250; Scott & Coustalin, supra note 1, at 83537.
55 See MacGrady, supra note 39, at 527. References to water being private
signify a private owner enjoying exclusive usufructuary rights in it. See
generally infra Part I.E. 1 (usufruct discussion).
56 See MacGrady, supra note 39, at 527 n.70, 528, 529 (quoting DIGEST,
supra note 42, §§ 39.3.10.2, 43.12.2); Scott & Coustalin, supra note 1, at 83637.
17 See MacGrady, supra note 39, at 527 n.70, 528, 529 (quoting DIGEST,
supra note 42, §§ 39.3.10.2, 43.12.2); Scott & Coustalin, supra note 1, at 840
(discussing private use rights from the medieval period into the Nineteenth
Century).
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uncompensated seizure by. the government for purposes the
government labeled "public. 58
In sum, no portion of modem compensation-denial theory
finds succor in the ancient doctrine. The summary, treatise
statement of the doctrine was concerned with waterways, not water
per se. More importantly, it was honored only in the breach, if at
all. In practice, the doctrine applied only to navigable waterways,
and created in effect no more than a navigation servitude in them
running to the people (i.e., permitting the people free use of
navigable waterways). 59 The law relating to water itself expressed
no rule of universal government control, permitted private wateruse rights to arise, and required compensation for the taking of
private rights. Ancient doctrine and practice no more support
uncompensated taking of water rights than they support mandatory
universal privatization of water resources.
Finally, the ancient public trust doctrines, both Roman and
English, arise as principles of natural law. 60 Natural law, though,
does not speak solely to management of (some) natural resources.
It equally privileges a variety of legal doctrines, including that
"[t]he great and chief end, therefore, of men[] uniting into
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the
preservation of their property. 61 It is difficult to see how a single
strand of natural-law can be plucked from the ancient fabric,
extensively expanded, and then deployed without regard to or
respect for principles of natural law at odds with that deployment.
Such a tactic at least requires comprehensive explanation before it
can support any modem doctrine. The move would equally
Eminent domain, and thus takings compensation obligations, arose in
England with Magna Carta, and developed along with, and more coherently than,
the public trust doctrine relied upon by modem theorists. See, e.g., JAMES W.
ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT 23-25 (3d ed. 2008);
BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS: FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 25-27, 34-35 (2001).
59 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 46, at 257-58 (comparing the English doctrine
of "constraint on the government's power to alienate.., some communal rights"
with the "quite different" proposed doctrine designed to allow "government to
extinguish private rights"); Huffman, supra note 36, at 528, 532-33 (describing
the ancient doctrine as an easement).
60 See BRACTON, supra note 39, at 39-40; INSTITUTES, supra note 39, § 2.1.1.
58

61 JOHN LoCKE, Second Treatise on Government, in Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 100, § 124 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press, 2003) (1690)
(emphasis removed). See also ELY, supra note 58, at 16-17; SIEGAN, supra note
58, at 46-50.
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support seizing on statements of the inviolability of physical
property at natural law (without regard to whether such
inviolability were a legal reality rather than merely an aspirational
statement), expanding that doctrine to include all potential
property, and asserting the expanded property doctrine while
ignoring all other considerations arising from natural law.
B.

The FederalPublic Trust Doctrine

The federal public trust doctrine (fPTD) arose from the
ancient doctrine. 62 It ensures that all lands beneath tidal or
navigable waterways pass to states unencumbered by (most) prestatehood land grants. The fPTD does not apply to the water
running in the waterway, and the question of whether states can
establish private rights in water has long since been answered
affirmatively. Were the fPTD to apply to water, though, it would
expressly free states to create private rights in that water, subject
only to the limited obligations of the navigation servitude. Either
way, no federal doctrine has ever interfered with state creation of
property rights in water, and none can now arise as a shield against
paying compensation for already extant water rights.
The Supreme Court most comprehensively explained the
fPTD in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi.63 At issue therein

was whether, "by virtue of the 'equal-footing doctrine'
[Mississippi] acquired at the time of statehood and held in public
trust all land lying under64 any waters influenced by the tide,
whether navigable or not."
The most coherent reading of Phillips indicates that the fPTD
applies to the land beneath waterways, not to water itself. The
Court explained that "[a]t common law, the title and dominion in
lands flowed by the tide water were in the King for the benefit of
the nation....

Upon the. American Revolution, these rights,

charged with a like trust, were vested in the original States within
62 Actually, it arose from a minor misunderstanding of ancient English
doctrine. Though that doctrine only-at most--created a rebuttable presumption
against private ownership in public trust properties, American authorities relied
instead on the misunderstanding that the King could not sell the lands. This
misunderstanding provided a basis for transmitting the lands in full fee title to
the states. See MacGrady, supra note 39, at 547-51, 588-96; supra notes 49-53
and accompanying text. The doctrinal shift occasioned by this confusion,
however, has no effect on these considerations.
63 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
64 Id. at 472.
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their respective borders, subject to the rights surrendered by the
Constitution of the United States. 6 5 Similarly, it explained that
Knight v. U.S. Land Association stated that "[i]t is the settled rule
of law in this court that absolute property in, and dominion and
sovereignty over, the soils under the tide waters in the original
States were reserved to the several States, and that the new States
since admitted have the same rights, sovereignty and jurisdiction in
that behalf as the original States possess within their respective
borders." 66 Such land-specific references continue throughout the
opinion.6 7 The Court also quoted Shively v. Bowiby for the
proposition that "[t]he new States admitted into the Union since
the adoption of the Constitution have the same rights as the
original States in the tide waters, and in the lands under them,
within their respective jurisdictions. 6 8 Because of the Court's
focus on tide waters, and on English tradition, which related to
waterways rather than water itself, this statement does not create
the impression that the Court was implicating water as waterrather than waterways so far as they function as highways-as
within the scope of the fPTD.
Assuming arguendo, however, that the water constituting the
navigable waters is itself subject to the fPTD,6 9 the result is that
states are free to create cognizable-and constitutionally
protected-private property rights in the water. As the Phillips
Court explained, under the fPTD, "the individual States have the
authority to define the limits of" property encompassed by the
fPTD "and to recognize private rights in such [property] as they
see fit.' 7 0 It noted that "[s]ome of the original States, for example,
did recognize more private interests in tidelands than did others of
the 13-more private interests than were recognized at common
law, or in the dictates of our public trust cases. ' '7 1 The remaining
61 Id. at 473-74 (emphasis added) (quoting Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1,

57 1894)).
6 Id. at 474 (emphasis added) (quoting Knight v. U.S. Land Ass'n, 142 U.S.
161, 183 (1891).
67 See, e.g., id. at 475, 478, 479, 483.
68 Id. at 474 (emphasis added); see also id. at 479 ("This Court's decisions in
The Genesee Chief and Barney v. Keokuk extended admiralty jurisdiction and
public trust doctrine to navigable freshwaters and the lands beneath them.").
69 Cf Wilkinson, supra note 38, at 462 (observing that Phillips involved
a

dis!ute over real property title to tidelands, not public's right of access to water).
Phillips,484 U.S. at 475. Cf Thompson, supra note 41, at 57.
71 Phillips, 484 U.S. at 475.
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states enjoy the same freedom:
As this Court wrote in Shively v. Bowlby, 'there is no universal

and uniform law upon the subject; but... each State has dealt
With the lands under the tide waters [i.e., the property covered
by the public trust] within its borders according to its own
views of justice and policy.... [M]any coastal States, as a

matter of state law, granted all or a portion of their tidelands to
adjacent upland property owners long ago. Our decision today
does nothing to change ownership rights in States which
previously relinquished
7 2 a public trust claim to tidelands such as
those at issue here."

So even if water is subject to the fPTD, this simply places the
water in the hands of the states at the moment of admission-for
the states to use, legislate with regard to, and privatize if desired,
so long as the federal navigational servitude is respected.73 This
done, the fPTD dissolves. 74 Alternatively, if the navigation
servitude is understood as a component of the fPTD, then all
aspects of the fPTD except the servitude extinguish. If water is not
subject to the fPTD, the result is the same: the states are, as the
federal government has long recognized, free to create private
rights in their waters.
The plain statement of the fPTD in Phillips effectively
forecloses claims that, as a descriptive matter, there is a fPTD
(separate from the navigation servitude) holding that "while the
states were granted title to" public trust properties, "the title was
encumbered with a trust obligation that they use the [property] for
trust purposes. ' 75 Nevertheless, compensation opposers, ignoring
or misconstruing Phillips, have persevered. Such scholars most
commonly rely on Illinois CentralRailroad.v. llinois76 to support
their positions.77 But in doing so they either misread Illinois
72

Id. at 483 (citation omitted).

71See id. at 479.

74 Huffman reached a similar conclusion prior to the Phillips decision. See
Huffman, supra note 36, at 541 ("When the lands were transferred to the new
states, however, consistent with the terms of the trust, the trust created by the
equal footing doctrine was terminated.").
Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 36, at 714; see also R. Prescott Jaunich,
The Environment, the Free Market, and Property Rights: Post-Lucas
Privatizationof the Public Trust, 15 PuB. LAND L. REv. 167, 183 (1994).
76 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
77

See,

e.g., 4

WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS,

supra note 21, §§ 30.02, 33.03;

Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 36, at 713-15.
accompanying this discussion.

See also infra notes
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Central, or demonstrate that Phillips and other Supreme Court
precedent have overruled Illinois Central sub silentio.
Illinois Central arose because of a remarkable deal the state of
Illinois offered the Illinois Central Railroad. It proposed in 1869
legislation to grant in fee simple to the railroad a vast swathe of
Chicago's harbor, reaching a mile into Lake Michigan, in
exchange for seven percent of the railroad's gross revenues.78 The
grant included "all the right and title of the State of Illinois in and
to the submerged lands," provided that the railroad could never sell
or convey the land or "obstruct[] ... the Chicago harbor, or impair
the public right of navigation;" and that the grant would not
exempt the railroad from state regulation of wharfage and dockage
fees. 79 The railroad accepted in November 1870.80 In April 1873
the Illinois legislature repealed the act authorizing the deal. 8 1 Suit
followed.
As the Court noted, the legislature's 1869 deal contained a
massive flaw: while it required that the railroad not "obstruct[]...
or impair" navigation, it had not required the railroad to develop
navigational facilities, nor had it retained any authority to require
82
or oversee such development, or navigation undertaken thereon.
This abdicated the state's obligation to ensure that "the people of
the state... may enjoy the navigation of the [navigable] waters,
carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein,
83
freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties."
The opinion further clarified that the federal interest extends
only to protecting the ability of the people freely to access
navigable waters. "[G]rants of parcels of lands under navigable
waters, that may afford foundation for wharves, piers, docks and
other structures in aid of commerce," pass muster, as do "grants of
parcels which, being occupied, do not substantially impair the
public interest in the lands and waters remaining." 84 The limit was
that "all the lands under the navigable waters" could not be
alienated to "leave them entirely under the use and control of
private parties" because "they cannot be placed entirely beyond the
78 Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 448-49.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 449.
81

Id.

82 Id. at 451.

83 Id. at 452; see also id. at 453-64.
84 Id. at 452.
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85
direction and control of the State."

The bargain at issue in Illinois Central exceeded that limit by
wholly abdicating Illinois's obligation to protect free navigation.
The deal was invalid (or at least revocable) insofar as necessary to
permit resumption of Illinois's navigation-protection duties once
the state judged that the railroad's actions under the bargain were
not wholly consistent with preferred navigation-protection
policy. 86 (The Court hinted that the result might have been
different if the railroad had accepted an interpretation of the

contract that allowed state navigation-fostering regulatory
authority, but the railroad had insisted that the contract precluded
such authority. 87) Hence, the state's 1873 revocation of the grant

was validated. 88 Even so, Illinois could not unload on the railroad
the costs of its erroneous abdication of navigation oversight, and
was obliged to compensate the railroad for
any "expenses incurred
89
in improvements made under" the grant.
This understanding of Illinois Central reconciles it with
Phillips. Phillips, as discussed, teaches that the fPTD conveys

"absolute property in, and dominion and sovereignty over" trustprotected lands to a state upon admission; the fPTD is then
extinguished. In fact, Phillips cites Illinois Central in support of
exactly this proposition.9" Illinois Central and Phillips cannot be
read compatibly unless Illinois Central is interpreted as above, so

that the only obligation (or "trust") under consideration in the case
is the one, running from the state to its people, imposed by the
navigation servitude. 91

The compensation-denial proposition makes rather more
extravagant claims about Illinois Central, referring to it as the
85 Id. at 453-54 (emphasis added).
86 See id. at 455.
Cf Thompson, supra note 41, at 65 ("The major
concern... in Illinois Central... was less the privatization of the outer Chicago
harbor and more the potential loss of state jurisdiction and authority over the
harbor.").
87 See Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 450 ("This clause is treated by the counsel
of the company as an absolute conveyance to it of title to the submerged
lands ....Treating it as such a conveyance, its validity must be determined by
the consideration whether the legislature was competent to make a grant of the
kind.").
88 Id. at 459. Cf Huffman, supra note 36, at 563.
89 See Illinois Cent. 146 U.S. at 455.
90 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 474 n.2 (1988).
9' Cf Rasband, supra note 39, at 66-69 (asserting that Phillips is similarly
irreconcilable with Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894)).
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lodestar of the project.92 As the discussion above indicates,
however, the case is miscast in that role. If it is a lodestar, it
reveals the true north of the navigation servitude, and the
responsibilities running from the states to the people in light of that
servitude, nothing more. Thus, it is not true that "[t]he Court's
decision makes sense only because the Court determined that the
states have special regulatory obligations over shorelands,
obligations which are inconsistent with large-scale private
ownership. 9 3 The real holding is only that complete ownership of
such lands is impermissible if twinned with an abdication of
general oversight of issues relating to navigation and the public's
free access thereto. Similarly, it is a misreading to suggest that
Illinois Central stands for the proposition that
[w]hen a state holds a resource which is available for the free
use of the general public, a court will look with considerable
skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is calculated
either to reallocate that resource to more restricted uses
94 or to
subject public uses to the self-interest of private parties.
None of this is actually the case. First, the Illinois Central
Court was not considering any "resource which is available for the
92 Sax, Natural Resource Law, supra note 24, at 489-91. See, e.g., Jaunich,
supra note 75, at 179; Sax, Constitution, supra note 16, at 275; Sax, Limits of
Private Rights, supra note 32, at 481. See generally 4 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS, supra note 21, §§ 30.02, 33.03.
93 Sax, NaturalResource Law, supra note 24, at 489; see also 4 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS, supra note 21, § 33.03. Sax's argument that Illinois Central

only makes sense if read to forbid large-scale private ownership of the
shorelands relies on his assertion that the conclusion is obliged because "the
mere granting of property to a private owner does not ipso facto prevent the
exercise of the police power, for states routinely exercise a great deal of
regulatory authority over privately owned land." Sax, Natural Resource Law,
supra note 24, at 489. But Sax provides no evidence that such power was
routinely exercised in 1870. Nor does he suggest that whatever routine authority
was exercised then would have permitted the state to oversee the details of
navigation-protection (which details were plainly the Court's focus) given the
terms of the bargain between the state and the railroad. As the Court repeatedly
explained, that bargain, to the extent it was valid, extinguished all state oversight
of the property contained within the grant (except, as expressly preserved, the
state's right to set wharfage and dockage fees). See, e.g., Illinois Cent., 146 U.S.
at 451. It is this contract-extinguished oversight and protection of navigation that
the Court stepped in to protect, as it explained. There is neither need nor room to
manufacture expansive doctrine to make sense of the decision. Cf Thompson,
supra note 41, at 65 (stating that the key point of decision was state power to
revoke the grant and exercise full jurisdiction over the harbor).
94 Sax, Natural Resource Law, supra note 24, at 490 (emphasis in original).
Cf Stevens, supra note 38, at 212.

Environmental
N.Y.U.
Permission
Imaged withHeinOnline
-- 17from
N.Y.U.
Envtl. L.J.
1084 2008-2009Law Journal

2009]

UNBEARABLE COST OF SKIPPING THE CHECK

1085

free use of the general public," whatever that might actually mean.
It was dealing with the right of access for free navigation (and
fisheries) afforded to individuals by the federal Constitution (and
pre-constitutionally memorialized in the Northwest Ordinance), 5
and protecting that right. Thus the Court held no brief against
governments reallocating resources to uses more restricted than
"the free use of the general public," so long as the uses did not
substantially interfere with the navigation servitude. As noted
above, the Court expressly contemplated sale of shorelands to
private parties.96 Nor did the Court object to the state's subjecting
public uses to the self-interest of private parties. Again, it
expressly contemplated the "subjection" of the sole public
use97
access for navigation and fishing-to private self-interest.
Another barrier to using Illinois Central to establish a
compensation-denying fPTD arises because the Supreme Court has
long since repudiated Illinois Central as a statement based on
federal law at all. It explained in Appleby v. New York that "the
conclusion reached [in 98Illinois Central] was necessarily a
statement of Illinois law."
Phillips, Illinois Central and the fPTD provide a particularly
poor lodestar for the compensation-denying proposition.
References in Phillips and Illinois Central to "waters" refer to
navigable waterways, not to water itself. More stymieing, the
cases demonstrate that even property subject to the full extent of
post-statehood public interest (i.e., the navigation servitude) may
be alienated broadly to private parties. Finally, in the extremely
rare instance in which an alienation ineluctably interferes with the
federal interest, unwinding the alienation requires compensation by

95 See Northwest Ordinance, ch. 8, art. IV, I Stat. 50, 52 (1789) ("The

navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence... shall be
common highways, and forever free... "); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar
Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 71-72 (1913) (stating that title in the bed of a
river granted to a private party was subject to a navigation servitude based in the
Commerce Clause).
The obligations of the Northwest Ordinance were
instantiated as well in the Admission Acts of states carved out of lands not part
of the Northwest Territory. See, e.g., Oregon Admission Acts, ch. 33, § 2, 11
Stat. 383 (1859) (declaring "rivers and waters, and all the navigable waters" of
the state to be "common highways and forever free").
96 See Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 452; supra text accompanying notes 84 &
85.
9' See Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 452.
98 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926).
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99
the state for any expenditures made in reliance upon it.

C.

Other PurportedFederalDefenses to Compensation

Beyond the fPTD as explicated above lie other federal
authorities and doctrines that contour state authority- to create
water rights, and the permissible content of the rights, in certain
narrow ways. They arise from the very fabric of the federal
constitutional (and pre-constitutional) structure, and extend only to
the circumscribed limits of these established, constitutionally
necessary purposes. They provide no support for claims that
federal law condones uncompensated taking of validly created
water rights.
1.

NavigationServitude

The federal navigation servitude undoubtedly applies to
waterways navigable under the federal definition.' 00 The servitude
grants the federal government
the power to destroy the navigable capacity of the waters, and
prevent navigation, by the construction of obstructions. It also
includes the power to protect the navigable capacity by
preventing diversions of the water itself, or of nonnavigable
tributaries that affect navigability, or by preventing obstructions
by bridges or dams or by constructing flood control structures
on the navigable waters or on their nonnavigable tributaries or
even on the watersheds of the rivers and tributaries. The
powers to prevent obstruction in turn lead to powers to license
obstructions. The power to obstruct leads to 10the
1 power to
generate electric energy from the dammed water.
The federal navigational servitude creates in states the
responsibility of permitting access by state and U.S. citizens to
navigable waters
for purposes of navigation, fishing and
02
commerce. 1
99 Cf Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 455.
100 See, e.g., Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443, 453 (1851)

(stating that the navigation servitude extends to navigable waters, not just tidal
waters); Huffman, supra note 36, at 530-31 (describing the contours of the
federal servitude).
'01 Frank Trelease, FederalLimitations on State Water Law, 10 BuFF. L. REV.
399, 400 (1971) (citations omitted). See also United States v. Rio Grande Dam
& Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
102 See supra Part I.B. Note that the obligation is to provide access for fishing
in navigable waterways, not some level of naturally undiminished fisheries. But
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The roots of the servitude reach behind the Constitution to the
Northwest Ordinance and the ancient public trust doctrine; it finds
purchase in the Commerce Clause; and it reaches forward into the
foundational instruments of numerous states.' 0 3 However, nothing

like that sort of pervasive injunction-in fact, nothing whateversupports theories applying the servitude to defeat states' creation

of water rights, or defending against compensation for takings of
to protect the navigable capacity
water rights, except as necessary
04
of a federally navigable water.1
2.

FederalReservations of Water

Interplay between state water rights and federal law also
arises from federal reservations of water. The federal government
had the power, pre-statehood, to reserve certain amounts of water

from passing to a state upon admission.

05

This reservation could

occur explicitly or, as in Winters v. United States, by absolutely

necessary implication combined with "a rule of interpretation of
agreements and treaties with the Indians, [that] ambiguities
10 6
occurring will be resolved from the standpoint of the Indians."

The Supreme Court has also recognized Congress's ability
cf Ralph W. Johnson, Water Pollution and the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL.
L. 485, 488, 495 (1989). Johnson's concept cannot make sense, because fishing
in the fisheries would itself derogate from the pristine natural condition that
In fact, simply
Johnson alleges the public trust doctrine to encompass.
recognizing something as a fishery admits of it as a non-natural (in the sense of
being protected from human intrusion) entity.
103See supra note 95.
The Northwest Ordinance, enancted by the
Confederation Congress in 1787, was the constitutive framework for the
territories lying west of the Allegheny Mountains that the United States won
from Great Britain in the Peace of Paris in 1783.
'04See Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 415 (1929) (citing United States
v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, 62 (1913)); United States v. River Rouge
Improvement Co. 269 U.S. 411, 419 (1926); Port of Seattle v. Oregon &
Washington R.R., 255 U.S. 56, 63 (1921) (clarifying that the navigation
servitude only sanctions federal interference in water as necessary to effect
navigation purposes) (decided on statutory grounds). Cf New Jersey v. New
York, 283 U.S. 336, 344 (1931) (limiting federal interest in tributaries to extent
of navigation servitude); Huffman, supra note 36, at 554-55 (describing the
public's interest in access to navigation and fishing as "inviolable as ...any
other vested property right"); id. at 562-63 (defining the obligations arising from
common-law tradition and federal mandate in the waters of a state as those of
ensuring the public's access to navigation and fishing).
105 See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 575-78 (1908) (citing United
States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); Rio Grande Dam, 174 U.S. at 702).
106 Id. at 576.
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impliedly to reserve "appurtenant water then unappropriated to the
10 7
extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation."
The Court has declared, however, that the organic national forest
and parks acts, and later acts broadening their purposes, did not
include general reservations for ecological uses,10 8 while the
National Park Service Act explicitly recognized the federal duty to
establish (and pay for) water rights for non-essential, pre-reserved
purposes in national parks. 10 9 The reservations doctrine, then,
despite contrary claims, 1 0 grants the federal government no ability
to take, now, previously appropriated waters without
compensation, nor to claim that it had, sub silentio, previously
reserved since-appropriated waters for in-stream uses, thus
effectively nullifying their appropriation without compensation.
3.

InterstateApportionment

In interstate apportionment cases, the federal courts open their
good offices to the states to settle questions of the division of
available water supplies. The federal government acts merely as
an honest broker, and, as Justice Holmes memorably put it, as the
means by which the Republic avoids war in contests between
states; 1 1 its apportionment duties in no way implicate or support
non-compensated takings of water rights.
The interstateapportionment doctrine that guides their labors, holding that waters
1 12
that run through multiple states must be divided reasonably,
likewise does not establish a federal basis for uncompensated
13
takings of water rights."
Whether states should in some circumstances compensate
right holders for water rights that effectively disappear upon any
given apportionment is a nice question. The Supreme Court has
answered that it does not, because the equitable apportionment to
which each state is entitled represent an a priori limit on the
107 United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 699-700 (1978) (emphasis
changed) (quoting Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976)).
108 See id. at 705-15.
109 See id. at 702-03.
10 See, e.g., Getches, supra note 14, at 7.

...See New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931).
112 See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92,
102-03 (1938).
113 Contra Sax, Limits of Private Rights, supra note 32, at 482 (asserting that
equitable apportionment doctrine supports "reduc[ing] or displac[ing]" preexisting water rights).
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amount of water the state controls, and a state cannot create rights
in, essentially, other sovereigns' property, so the rights were never
created. 114 The contrary position-that a state must pay takings
compensation if it creates non-contingent rights in property that it
turns out not to control, the error lying with it rather than the
innocent purchaser or grantee-probably does greater equity and
justice. l l 5 Under neither interpretation, however, does the doctrine
provide federal support for uncompensated takings of rights to
water property under a state's control.
D. Scholarly Failureto Treat Western Water Law
as a Unique, EstablishedLegal System
Other federal cases raised to support compensation denial
prove equally unavailing, and the claims made in their behalf
illustrate a fundamental flaw in the compensation-denial position.
Scholars-either by conflating the riparian water schemes in
eastern states with prior appropriation schemes in western states,
or simply by refusing to recognize the western system as a
legitimate choice conclusively made by the relevant statescontinue erroneously to assert that the water law of the western
states remains a flux from which no rights could possibly have
emerged and acquired constitutional protection. Sax and others
have pointed, for instance, to a trio of early-20th century opinions
penned by Oliver Wendell Holmes." 6 In Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper, Georgia sought an injunction against Tennessee Copper's
practice of "discharging noxious gas from their works in
Tennessee over the plaintiff's territory."11 7 The Court enjoined the
discharge. In dictum, Holmes wrote that
in its capacity of quasi-sovereign... the state has an interest
independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the
earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to
whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its
114 See Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 108; James H. Davenport & Craig Bell,
Governmental Interference with the Use of Water: When Do Unconstitutional
"Takings" Occur?, 9 U. DENY. WATER L. REv. 1, 33-34 (2005).
115 See Leshy, supra note 36, at 1990 (describing the insecurity that arises

from equitable apportionment doctrine).
116 See, e.g., Leshy, supra note 36, at 2019-20; Andrew H. Sawyer, Changing
Landscapes and Evolving Law: Lessons from Mono Lake on Takings and the
Public Trust, 50 OKLA. L. REv. 311, 344-45 (1997); Sax, Constitution, supra
note 16, at 274-76; Sax, Limits of PrivateRights, supra note 32, at 479-81.
117 Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907).
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inhabitants shall breathe pure air. It might have to pay
individuals before
it could utter that word, but with it remains
118
the final power.
In Hudson County Water Co. v. MeCarter,the Court held that
a riparian state could restrict a resident's pumping of riparian
waters in that state for transfer to another riparian state. 119 And in
New Jersey v. New York, the Court held that one riparian state
could divert some riparian
water for urban consumption as against
20
another riparian state.'
These cases together allegedly demonstrate that by federal
imperative "it is within the power of each state to control its own
economy and its own future by reserving to itself, and not
abdicating to private property owners, the responsibility to
determine the proper use of the natural resources within its
border." 12' In a sense, this is true without recourse to Holmes: the
Fifth Amendment allows states to redirect the use of natural
resources within their borders, over the heads of private ownersusing eminent domain and paying compensation. Compensation
opponents, though, mean something else: that some subtle federal
principle, revealed by Holmes in these passages, allows states
to
22
1
compensation.
without
rights
natural-resource
private
upend
These cases, though, do not support that proposition. The
Tennessee Copper passage explicitly contemplates the eminentdomain power and the compensation obligation, but does not
contemplate uncompensated takings at all. (If the passage were
somehow read to mean that a state's "interest independent of and
behind the titles of its citizens" permitted uncompensated takings,
it would permit such takings of "all the earth and air"-all real
property-"within its domain."' 123 It is reasonable to expect that a
federal principle that eviscerated a guarantee enshrined in the Bill
of Rights would be stated somewhat more expressly, with surer
support, and in a less obscure forum, than Holmes's dictum.)
To the extent that Tennessee Copper elaborates a state's
freedom to develop "resource control" regimes. of its own
choosing, it thereby redundantly endorses the western states'
"8 Id. at 237.

209 U.S. 349, 354-56 (1908).
120283 U.S. 336, 342-46 (1931).
121 Sax, Limits of PrivateRights, supra note 32, at 479.
122 See, e.g., Sax, Constitution, supra note 16, at 280.
19

123 Georgia

v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
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authority to depart from eastern riparianism.

Hudson County

Water and New Jersey v. New York further ratify this authority by

explicitly limiting their holdings to riparian water rights in riparian
states. 12

The Court also recognized in the latter case that the

controversy, being between independent sovereigns, required
application of a different standard than would a case involving
private parties, which further undermines
any reliance on the case
25
for compensation-denial purposes. 1
Compensation opponents' reliance on these cases illustrates
their failure to recognize or accept that western states have, in their
sovereign capacity, established a non-riparian water-resource
system, and that the western system deserves as much respect, on
its own terms, as the eastern riparian system.1 26 This failure,
which appears repeatedly in scholarly literature opposing

compensation, serves as the basis for claims that western water
rights need not be treated with constitutional solemnity because
water law has reacted flexibly to emergent challenges in the
past. 127
124See New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. at 343 (focusing exclusively on

riparian rights, noting that "[tjhe different traditions and practices in different
parts of the country may lead to varying results"); Hudson County, 209 U.S. at
356 ("The problems of irrigation have no place here.... [W]e are of opinion that
the private property of riparianproprietors cannot be supposed to have deeper
roots.... [W]e agree with the New Jersey courts, and think it quite beyond any
rational view of riparian rights, that an agreement, of no matter what private
owners, could sanction the diversion of an important stream outside the
boundaries of the state in which it flows.") (emphasis added).
125 See New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. at 342.
126 See Sax, Constitution, supra note 16, at 274. Sax praised the Holmes
opinions above for, "vouchsafling] to each state the capacity to control its
economy and its future by letting it determine the role its natural resources would
play." Id. Then he deployed riparian-rights arguments as challenges to
appropriative water rights, failing to acknowledge that the move undercuts-and
reads out as illegitimate-western states' departure from riparianism. When
vouchsafed the capacity to control their economies and their future by
determining the role their natural resources would play, western states abandoned
riparianism and developed individual property rights in the use of water.
,27 See, e.g., Sax, Limits of Private Rights, supra note 32, at
473 ("The rights
of water users have always changed to meet new public demands, whether for
mill dams during the Industrial Revolution, for navigability to float logs during
the timber era, or for reduced discharges under modem pollution laws."). See
also Leshy, supra note 36, at 1985-88, 1996; Sax, Constitution, supra note 16, at
273-74 (conflating water taken as riparian right with water taken by western
appropriation); Sax, Rights that Inhere, supra note 21, at 943-46; Joseph L. Sax,
Environmental Law at the Turn of the Century: A Reportorial Fragment of
Contemporary History, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2375, 2384 (2000) [hereinafter Sax,
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Taking western water law seriously forbids such analysis.
While the broad sweep of the history of water law might be
characterized by continuous change, this is as a general matter true
of virtually all areas of law. That law generally evolves, however,

does not provide license to ignore concrete enactmentsparticularly constitutional enactments-in a given legal field.
State-level constitutional protections must be accorded dignity on
their own terms, not be overturned by the changing fashions of
non-conforming jurisdictions.
The Eighth Amendment, for
example, is not currently interpreted to ban the death penalty, but
some states have forbidden the practice. Analysis of the law of
punishment in a death-penalty-prohibiting state must attend to that
state's additional protection; arguments citing to the lack of deathpenalty prohibitions elsewhere, or to the changing face of
punishment prohibitions generally, to favor application of the
death penalty in the state would simply be ignoring the state's
independent jurisprudence, not interpreting it. Using riparian
precedent to justify the contention that "[h]olders of appropriative
rights in the West will now similarly have to adapt to new
128
conceptions" by surrendering their rights without compensation,
similarly reads western water law out of existence.
Reliance on Arnold v. Mundy, 129 a New Jersey Supreme Court

case, as compensation-denial precedent provides a stark example
ReportorialFragment]. Cf Rose, supra note 28, at 354-55 (noting tendency of
water rights regimes to evolve so as to "incorporate greater concern for diversity
and changes in use"). Often embedded within these assertions about the
continuously changing nature of water law are claims that western states
extinguished riparian rights, creating precedent for the like extinguishment of
prior-appropriation rights. See e.g., Leshy, supra note 36, at 1988. In fact,
though, the states chose one of the following options: never recognizing riparian
rights at all; extinguishing only unexercised riparian rights; recognizing
unexercised, exercised or grandfathered riparian rights; or compensating for
taken riparian rights. See, e.g., Davenport & Bell, supra note 114, at 69;
Huffman, supra note 36, at 570-71. Hence, riparian rights were accorded
substantial dignity in western states, even though never proclaimed or protected
in western-state constitutions or laws. As precedent they demonstrate that priorappropriation rights, which are so designated and protected, must be accorded yet
greater dignity and protection.
128 Sax, Limits of Private Rights, supra note 32, at 473. In asserting that
"[t]he roots of private property in water have simply never been deep enough to
vest in water users a compensable right to diminish lakes and rivers or to destroy
the marine life within them," Sax echoed Holmes's pronouncement explicitly
about riparian rights but dropped the reference to riparianism and applied the
dictum to western water rights. Id. at 482.
129 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
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of this regime-conflating phenomenon. 30
Such reliance
additionally fails because Arnold contains no holding of modem
relevance. In that case, Arnold claimed a right to exclude
trespassers from an oysterbed (i.e., the land beneath a navigable
waterway) on the basis of a grant from Charles II. The New Jersey
Court, in what its author warned in advance was a poorly
researched and hastily prepared opinion,13 1 held (erroneously, as
has been discussed) that the King's power did not extend to
granting title to such lands. 132 As a result, the lands passed
unburdened by private title to the state of New Jersey.
The Arnold Court added that because the King had lacked the
power to grant such lands, so did New Jersey. 133 This conclusion
failed to address Parliament's power to grant such titles, though,
and thus, as later New Jersey courts recognized in disavowing it,
lacked logical connection to New Jersey's entire sovereign
power. 134 Arnold thus provides to history only a necessarily dead
legal letter based on error, and logically fallacious dictum that has
been repudiated for more than a century and a half-and all of this
incapable of being a statement of anything more than New Jersey
state law in any event.
E. Asserted State-Law Defenses to Compensation
As previous sections consider, compensation-denial theory
can claim no justifiable support from ancient common law or
federal dictate, nor meaningful rhetorical or logical connections to
these sources of law and tradition. If any justification exists for
denying compensation for governmental takings of water rights,
then it must arise at the state level, without support from above or
behind. A wide variety of attempted justifications have been
made. These, stripped of their pretentions to federal or ancient
e.g., 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 21, § 30.02(c); Jan S.
Stevens, The Public Trust and In-Stream Uses, 19 ENVTL. L. 605, 606 & n.2
(1989) (demonstrating reliance on Arnold when discussing the public trust
doctrine in the appropriation context).
131 Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 9. Arnold is unfit as coherent precedent for anything,
much less the uncompensated taking of western water rights. See also
MacGrady, supra note 39, at 590-91; Rasband, supra note 39, at 22-25;
Thompson, supra note 41, at 57-58.
132 Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 70-71.
130 See,

Id. at 78.
134 See Gough v. Bell, 22 N.J.L. 441, 458-59 (1850), ajfd, 23 N.J.L. 624
(1852).
113
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common-law support (and without reference to whether the
theories have been presented as part of a state public trust doctrine,
or rather as a coordinate compensation-stripping theory 135) are
considered below. All are found wanting.
As has been noted above, the migration by western states
from riparianism to prior appropriation was no happenstance. It
was a considered response to the aridity and ruggedness of western
terrain. 136 Believing their new system to be a necessary response
to immutable western conditions, the founders of these polities
took few chances: many provided explicit constitutional status to
37

the appropriative system and the water rights created thereby.'

Those that went not quite this far nevertheless provided explicit
constitutional protections
(including takings-compensation
protections) for private38 property, and moved quickly to establish

statutory water rights.'
This should end the question. The states have established
property rights in water. The rights were important enough that
the states' founders often explicitly mentioned them in state
constitutions.
If the government takes a property right,
compensation must issue.139 Ergo, compensation must issue for
takings of water rights. Nevertheless, a variety of arguments have
been made in attempts to deny compensation.
1.

The "Public Water" Clauses and UsufructuaryRights

Scholars have argued that state constitutional clauses
declaring either that "waters within the boundaries of the state are
the property of the state"' 140 or that "the use of all water... [is] a
135Again, scholars do not agree about which of the doctrines described below
arise from or contribute to the state public trust doctrine theory, and which are
merely concomitant. See supra note 36. Consequently, each potential basis of
compensation-denial is treated separately.
136See supra note 3 (cases explaining that scarcity led to heightened privateproperty character of western water law). But see Leshy, supra note 36, at 1992
(asserting that scarcity led to heightened communalism in western water law).
1 See supra note 11.
38 See supra notes 12, 17. This is sufficient to create property rights.
Property rights in, say, land are respected, and compensation for taking of them
is due, without regard to the fact that property rights in land were not specifically
enumerated in the Fifth Amendment.
:39See supra'note 17.
40 MONT.CONST. art. IX, § 3(3). See also; N.M. CONST. art. XVI § 2; N.D.
CONST. art. XI, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. In the remainder of western
states, the provision is statutory. See 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note
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public use,"'14 1 negate the property-right status of water rights,
making appropriations of water mere licenses terminable at
"public" (meaning governmental) whim. 142 This argument ignores
the fact that the same constitutions that declare the water to be
state property, or all uses to be public uses, also declare water
rights available for private appropriation-often in the same
clauses. No coherent theory of constitutional interpretation allows
one clause or provision to obviate another clause or provision of
the same constitution-certainly not as against plausible readings
of the provisions that are not mutually exclusive.
Fortunately, no difficulty arises in reading these clauses
consistently and coherently together. First, the "public" clauses
should be read as assertions by the various states to the federal
government, which would ratify their initial state constitutions,
that they, and not the federal government, would control water
distribution within their states-and43that they would follow the
western, prior-appropriation system.1
Second, the "public title" clauses do not logically conflict
with the provisions creating property rights in the use of water.
Ownership of title and right of use are legally separable things;
concurrent constitutional provisions assigning the former to the
state and making the latter assignable to private parties
demonstrate that they have been separated. 144 This interpretation
21, § 30.04, at 30-66 n.297 (collecting statutes).
141 MONT. CONST. art. IX,

§ 3(2). See also ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3;

COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5; IDAHO CONST. art. XV, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. XV, §
5; OR. CONST. art. I, § 18.
142 See, e.g., Jan G. Laitos, Water Rights, Clean Water Act Section 404
Permitting, and the Takings Clause, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 901, 910-11 (1989);
Leshy, supra note 36, at 1991-92; Sax, Constitution,supra note 16, at 260. Cf
Douglas L. Grant, ESA Reductions in Reclamation Water ContractDeliveries: A
Fifth Amendment Taking of Property?, 36 ENVTL. L. 1331, 1377-82 (2006)
(accepting possibility that state public trust doctrine could expand to negate
water rights).
143 See, e.g., Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 61 P. 258, 264 (Wyo. 1900)
(recognizing that the act of Congress admitting the state into the Union accepted,
ratified and confirmed the constitution of Wyoming, including its clause vesting
in the state title to the waters therein).
'44 Cf John S. Harbison, Waist Deep in the Big Muddy: Property Rights,
Public Values, and Instream Waters, 26 LAND & WATER L. REV. 535, 558 (1991)
(proposing related explanation that clauses "mean[] ...that water is common
property until it is assigned to private individuals"). See also Colorado v.
Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Colo. 1979) (holding that the function of the
clause is to ensure an appropriative system); Willey v. Decker, 73 P. 210, 222
(Wyo. 1903) (holding that public ownership is sovereign, not proprietary, and
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carries particular power in the context of water, where the bare title
to individual molecules of water provides no practical value to
private owners. The practical value of the water lies in the ability
to use a flow of it over time, and to continue that use without
regard to individual particles of water-which of course will
simply evaporate and recharge the system.
Third, the clauses created the space for states to regulate the
use of water by means that do not implicate the taking of water
rights. It is unsurprising that states would expressly reserve such
regulatory power in the era when these constitutions were penned.
As one non-compensation supporter has recognized, "the
administration of water rights provided some of the earliest
examples in American government of regulatory agencies
145
controlling the use of private property for the common good."
The authors of these innovations would have 46made the effort to
ensure constitutional footing for their projects.
Fourth, the "public use" clauses ensured states the freedom to
employ (not ignore) eminent domain against any private use of
water in favor of any other use that the states might deem
beneficial. (Note that the "public use" language in the water-right
provisions tracks the "public use" languafe in the eminent-domain
provisions of those same constitutions. 47) In the days before
Kelo,148 the general presumption was that the words "public use"
in the U.S. Constitution meant something. If the use proposed by
government as the reason for taking a property were not public, the
taking could not occur, compensation notwithstanding.
By
declaring constitutionally that all water uses were public uses, the
states could attempt to ensure that any uses proposed by
government would be deemed public, and thus taking of private
subiect to appropriation rights).
Leshy, supra note 36, at 1994 n.29. In some states these general
guarantees of the state's right to regulate water rights were supplemented by
more specific explications of the administrative process that was to obtain.
CoT are WYO. CONST. art. I, § 31, with id. art. VIII, § 2.
14 Cf Ormsby County v. Kearney, 142 P. 803, 806 (Nev. 1914) (stating
that
administrative oversight is permissible because it is "designed to protect all water
users in their rights").
147 See IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 14 ("Private property may be taken for public

use, but not until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed
by law, shall be paid therefor"); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 29 ("Private property

shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation...
(emphasis added)).
14 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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property to achieve these purposes would be permitted-upon
.payment of takings compensation. 149
Thus, the best reading of western state constitutions-taking
seriously both the "public" clauses and the "pfivate, rights"
clauses-provides that the states retained title to and regulatory
oversight of the water within their boundaries, but created privateuse rights in the water's flow. 150 The states ensured that such use
rights could be taken by eminent-domain proceedings in favor of
any other beneficial use that the state might elect, but that the state
would have
to pay compensation for any exercise of eminent
15 1
domain.

Some commentators have objected that use (or usufructuary)
rights are somehow not genuine property rights, and thus were
never amenable to compensation when taken by eminent
domain. 152 The assertion, however, lacks foundation-these
149 Cf United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 752 (1950)
("The waters of which claimants are deprived are taken [by the federal
government] for resale largely to other private landowners... Thereby private
lands will be made more fruitful, more valuable, and their operation more
profitable."). A provision that all uses are "public uses" would allow
governments to use eminent domain even where, as here, the transfer is from one
set of private users to another. It would not, however, justify failure to
compensate the former owners.
o This "title for regulation" interpretation is not unique. The public title to
wild animals allows for their regulation by the state until the animals are reduced
to possession. See, e.g., State v. Dickinson Cheese Co., 200 N.W.2d 59, 61
(N.D. 1972).
"' See, e.g., White v. Farmers' Highline Canal & Reservoir Co., 43 P. 1028,
1030 (Colo. 1896) (stating that water rights are "among the most valuable
property rights known to the law."). Cf Benson, supra note 2, at 375 ("While
water in the West is nominally owned by the public, it tends not to be managed
or viewed as a public resource. Water rights holders generally view the water
they use as being their own, and they stress the private property nature of water
rights. Water management agencies and western state legislatures generally
accommodate the water users. State or public ownership of water has far more
meaning on paper than in practice." (citation omitted)).
152 See, e.g., Sax, ReportorialFragment,supra note 127, at 2383; Sax, Rights
that Inhere, supra note 21, at 944; see also Laitos, supra note 142, at 911.
Elsewhere, Sax suggests that usufructuary rights provide "only... a right to uses
compatible with the community's dependence on the property as a resource.
Thus, for example, one may own private property rights in a navigable river to
use the water, but those rights are subordinate to the community's transportation
needs in the river. The private use may be entirely eliminated where the
community's navigation needs so require... A usufructuary system drawing on
precedents like the navigation servitude would subordinate private uses to
demands for the maintenance of natural services, even where the private owner's
property is left valueless." Sax, Property & Economy, supra note 36, at 1452-53
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commentators cannot point to any doctrine or precedent, much less
a doctrine weighty enough to override constitutional dictate, that
denies compensation to usufructuary rights.' 53
In fact,
compensation for usufructuary right holders is common in the
American system.1 54
When a state constitution explicitly
recognizes a usufructuary right, certainly, compensation must issue
for the retaking of that right. As Sax has noted, "[t]he
constitutional law of water is the same as the constitutional law of
potatoes and pork chops."'' 55 So it is. When a property right in a
potato or a pork chop is extinguished by the government-say by
the government's taking the pork chop, or demanding that its
owner give -the pork chop over to someone else for governmentmandated use-then the government must compensate the pork

chop owner for this taking of property; as the Constitution
declares, private property may not be "taken for public use,
(emphasis in original). Sax also asserts that "[t]he presence of the navigation
servitude effectively reduces an owner's property interest to a usufruct." Id. at
1452 n.91. Impressing a servitude on a property right does not make it a
usufruct, however. And neither the navigation servitude nor any other extant
obligations on water rights extend to anything like the limits claimed here.
153 The sources Sax relies on do not support his characterization of
usufructuary rights. Willow River, for instance, explicitly considers riparian
water rights, explicitly excludes appropriative rights, and is not about usufructs
per se at all. See United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 50206 (1945). Sax quotes Blackstone as explaining that usufructs are "temporary
right[s] of using a thing, without having the ultimate property or full dominion of
the substance," but this does not suggest that usufructuary rights are revocable or
non-compensable. Sax, Property & Economy, supra note 36, at 1452 n.90. See
also 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 1, at 441-43; 1 WIEL supra note 1, at 14-21. Sax
appears to have conflated the categories of usufructuary rights and riparian
rights, and to have underrated the compensability of the former. See infra Part
I.D (conflation of riparian and appropriative traditions).
1.54See Liberty Dev. Corp. v. Metro. Utils. Dist., 751 N.W.2d 608, 616 (Neb.
2008) (recognizing compensation obligation when easement taken by utility
district); Moore v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 73 (2004) (recognizing
compensation obligation when easement taken by state Department of Natural
Resources). Cf United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377-78 (1946)
(discussing compensation to tenants whose temporary occupancy of a building
was taken through eminent domain); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323
U.S. 373, 377-79 (1945) (awarding compensation to tenant whose occupancy of
a portion of a leased building was temporarily taken through eminent domain).
155 Sax, Constitution, supra note .16, at 260. Sax is making the point that
"[n]owhere in the decisions of the Supreme Court is there any hint that water
rights are a constitutionally favored form of property." Id at 261. But neither, as
the article demonstrates, is there any justification for treating water rights as an
inferior form of property, or constitutional property protections as an inferior
form of constitutional right.
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without just compensation."' 56 Similarly, when a property right in
water is taken for government
(or government-dictated) use,
1 57
compensation must issue.
2.

Beneficial Use, Waste, Nuisance and Pollution

In contrast to the claims above-which at bottom are
assertions that the water rights explicitly granted by the western
states were not, a priori, compensable property rights at all-there
also arise claims that the constitutional, statutory, or common-law
structure of water rights allow them to be latterly redefined so as to
curtail or eviscerate the rights without compensation. Thus, the
argument goes, governments can change the meaning of
"beneficial use," or expand and redefine the doctrines against
*waste, nuisance, or pollution to defeat the constitutional
protections for water rights. 158 Though each prong of this effort
suffers unique flaws, a central problem cripples the whole: it
simply fails to treat western water rights with constitutional
dignity.
Doing so-applying noncontroversial rules of
constitutional interpretation to the considerations-defeats the
challenge on all fronts.
The types of uses that states consider beneficial have changed
over time-most relevantly, by recognizing in-stream uses as
beneficial uses, and thus blessing ecological use as legitimate.
This, as a prospective matter, is unobjectionable to a water-right
holder; he has no guarantee that unappropriated waters will
continue to be appropriated only for those uses for which they
amend. V.
Compensation for usufructs is neither denied nor confused by the fact that

156 U.S. CONST.

157

usufructs can be divided or subordinated. See Johnson, supra note 102, at 494,
496-97 (citing public recreational-use rights as justification for uncompensated
takings). In Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming, for instance, the public enjoys
rights to use waters recreationally where such use is possible. See S. Idaho Fish
& Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d 1295, 1298 (Idaho 1974);
Montana Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 168 (Mont.
1984); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 151 (Wyo. 1961). In each of these
instances, the general public usufruct to use recreationally is properly
subordinated to the specific private rights at stake, including specific beneficialuse water rights; essentially the residuum is in the public after the specific grants
are accounted for. See Picabo Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d at 1297; Curran, 682
P.2d at 170-71; Day, 362 P.2d at 145, 151.
158 See, e.g., Leshy, supra note 36, at 1996-98, 2000-01, 2008, 2017; Sax,
Constitution, supra note 16, at 268-69; Sax, Rights that Inhere, supra note 21, at
951.
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have been previously appropriated. Similarly, a state may tighten
the "duty" under which prospective water rights are granted;
would-be right-holders have no a priori claim to a given set of
water-right terms.
The claim that the beneficial-use rule can be used to reduce or
cancel extant water right without compensation, however, hinges
on the notion that it can be applied not only when the water right
vests, but can be reapplied with adjusting standards: types of uses
for which rights have been granted can be declared unbeneficial;
quantities of water properly appropriated to a beneficial use can be
revisited, found excessive, and scaled back.' 59 This would allow
states to reclaim water rights merely by redefining them out of
existence.
There is nothing about the beneficial-use provisions, however,
that compels or even suggests this retroactive, ratchet-like
interpretation. Nor, despite claims to the contrary, 16 0 was such
review-and-diminution the original interpretation of the beneficialuse requirement. 16 1 Indeed, despite sometimes expansive language
that could be interpreted to suggest otherwise (especially when
considered out of context), 162 courts have regularly permitted right
"9 See, e.g., Leshy, supra note 36, at 1996-98; Sax, Constitution, supra note
16, at 268-69. See generally Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and
Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28
ENVTL. L. 919 (1998).
160 See, e.g., Sax, Rights that Inhere, supra note 21, at 945-46, 948, 950-51.
161 See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 5, § 12.02(c)(2); see also
Neuman, supra note 159, at 928.
162 See, e.g., Huffine v. Miller, 237 P. 1103, 1104 (Mont. 1925)
("Appropriators of water cannot maintain a valid claim to an amount of water in
excess of the beneficial use to which it is applied, and when the appropriator or
his successor ceases to use the water for such beneficial purpose, the right
ceases."); Conrow v. Huffine, 138 P. 1094, 1096 (Mont. 1914) ("If the
conditions change as time passes, and the necessity for the use diminishes, to the
extent of the lessened necessity the change inures to the benefit of subsequent
appropriators having need of the use ....
"); Foster v. Foster, 213 P. 895, 898
(Or. 1923) ("No right is hereby granted or allowed to divert a greater quantity of
water... than such appropriator can beneficially use for the purposes for which
the water is to be put."); Romey v. Landers, 392 N.W.2d 415, 419 (S.D. 1986)
("The reasonableness of the use depends upon the volume of water in the stream,
seasons and climatic conditions and the needs of other riparian proprietors as
well as the needs of the water user." (quoting Omernick v. Dep't of Natural Res.,
238 NW.2d 114, 116 (1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 941 (1976))); Green River
Canal Co. v. Thayn, 84 P.3d 1134, 1144, 1146 (Utah 2003) ("Our obligation is to
ensure that water is put to the most beneficial use."); Wayman v. Murray City
Corp., 458 P.2d 861, 866 (Utah 1969) ("[I]t seems more in harmony with the
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holders to continue to exercise their water rights in the manner and
amounts appurtenant to the original grant of right. 163 Courts have
limited appropriations on the basis that the water was not being put
to the beneficial use for which it was originally granted, or was
being used inefficiently based on the original standards. 164 The
beneficial-use requirement has not, however, been used as a
means, ex post, of stripping away water rights that continue to be
used as originally authorized.1 65 Various courts have recognized
a ratchet effect would violate
that giving the beneficial-use rule
66
interests.'
property
holders'
right
These courts have reached the right conclusion. As a
constitutional provision, the beneficial-use requirement must be
interpreted according to the same constraints applied to the "public
ownership/public use" clauses: no coherent constitutionalinterpretation theory would permit reading one part of a
constitutional provision to eviscerate another part-or the whole
provision of which it is a part-if any other reading were plausibly
available. (Statutory beneficial-use provisions, meanwhile, cannot
obviate constitutional dictate.) Reading beneficial-use provisions
to acquire specific content when the right vests gives meaning to
both the beneficial use requirement and the water right itself, by
major objective of the law to conclude that the means of diversion must be
reasonable and consistent with the state of development of water in the
area .. ");In re Water Rights of Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 348 P.2d

679, 682 (Utah 1960) ("Wasteful methods must be discontinued. The duty to
accomplish this desired end falls upon all users regardless of the priority of
appropriation."); Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1051 (Wash. 1993)

(en banc) ("A particular use must not only be of benefit to the appropriator, but it
must also be a reasonable and economical use of the water in view of other
present and future demands upon the source of supply.").

163 See, e.g., Wayment v. Howard, 144 P.3d 1147, 1150 (Utah 2006)
(clarifying or overruling sub silentio dictum in Wayman, Escalante Valley, and

other Utah cases); see also Board of the County Comm'rs of Arapahoe v. Crystal
Creek Homeowners' Ass'n, 14 P.3d 325, 333 (Colo. 2000); City and County of
Denver v. Consol. Ditches Co., 807 P.2d 23, 34 n.8 (Colo. 1991); Huffine v.
Miller, 237 P. at 1104; Conrow v. Huffme, 138 P. at 1094-97; Foster,213 P. at
900; Green River Canal Co. 84 P.3d at 1146; Wayman, 458 P.2d at 867;
Escalante Valley, 348 P.2d at 682; Grimes, 852 P.2d at 1054-55.
164See supra note 163.
165 See id.
166 See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 868-70 (1996)
(holding that sovereign acts that deprive a contract right holder of that right

retroactively are a compensable taking of property); Wayment, 144 P.3d at 1150;
Escalante Valley, 348 P.2d at 682 ("The court cannot by such means eliminate or
modify established water rights."); Grimes, 852 P.2d at 1054.
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establishing stable parameters to which constitutional protections
thereafter apply.
Reading beneficial-use provisions as
permanently reinterpretable, however, robs the property right of
any constitutional content.
A simple example illustrates this point. Consider the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which forbids
"cruel and unusual punishments." 167 The formulation of that
Amendment is similar to that of "beneficial-use water rights"-an
adjectival modification of a constitutionally recognized thing. The
Eighth Amendment, of course, has not been interpreted to allow a
government, state or federal, to overturn the determination that a
punishment is cruel or unusual simply by declaring it non-cruel
and non-unusual. 168 Nor is the content of "cruel and unusual"
otherwise determined wholly at the present government's
discretion. In fact, if a proposed interpretation of the provision
would allow such complete discretion, it would be rejected for that
reason-because the interpretation would eviscerate the
constitutional protection. 169
The doctrine of waste, meanwhile, does not have any meaning
independent of beneficial use. Waste simply means taking water
and failing to put it to beneficial use, whether by putting it to no
use or to non-beneficial use. 170 Establishing that the parameters of
beneficial use for a water right are set when it vests establishes the
same thing about waste.
The common-law doctrine of nuisance also cannot strip a
167
168

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1983) ("[T]he Eighth

Amendment[] ...embraces, at a minimum, those modes or acts of punishment
that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was
adopted.").
169In fact, the hard core of the constitutional protection is that,
at very least,
what was a "cruel and unusual punishment" at the time of passage of the
Amendment remains a cruel and unusual punishment today. See id. Additional
punishments can be determined to be cruel and unusual by the development of
public opinions and public policy, but the hard core of the right cannot shrinkand the whole of the right itself certainly cannot be destroyed. See id. at 406.
The case is the same with "beneficial use" water rights. Developments in public
opinion and public policy have caused the inclusion as "beneficial uses" of
things that were not previously beneficial uses. While this expansion could itself
raise objections if, as with in-stream uses, the new beneficial use is the very use
that was initially considered un-beneficial, it is at least coherent in that it does
not eviscerate the original rights articulated.
170 See, e.g., 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 5,
§ 12.02(c)(2), at
12-35 to 12-36.
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water right without compensation. By constitutional act and
statutory explication the western states rejected the previously
17 1
existing common law of riparianism, and adopted a new system.
As part of that system, they granted rights to use water in specific
ways (i.e., beneficial uses). By these enactments they explicitly
declared that such uses were approved. They thereby extinguished
any background notion that such accepted uses could72be deemed
nuisances, and foreclosed reliance on such arguments. 1
The states also thereby prevented the subsequent
development of compensation-stripping doctrine. Much has been
made about the supposed incoherence or incomprehensibility of
nuisance doctrine, 173 and this has been cited as justification for
arguing that, because nuisance doctrine can adapt over time, it is
the'adaptation itself that is the "background principle" of nuisance
law-so that any new uses or values a state wishes to label
"nuisance" can be denied a property owner without takings
compensation. 174
This misreads the precedent, and defies
constitutional logic.

175

The relevant issue is the actual nuisance

171 See supra note 4 and accompanying text, and Part I.D.
172 Cf. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028-30

(1992).
173 See, e.g., Louise A. Halper, Why the Nuisance Knot Can't Undo the
Takings Muddle, 28 IND. L. REV. 329, 335-36 & n.41-46 (1995) (citing
WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 71, at 549 (1941)

(describing nuisance law as an impenetrable jungle); John E. Bryson & Angus
Macbeth, Public Nuisance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and
Environmental Law, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 241, 241 (1972) (describing nuisance law
as a quagmire); F. H. Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 L.Q. REV. 480,
480 (1949) (stating that using nuisance law to allow non-compensable total
deprivation of value is a doctrine "intractable of definition" and a mongrel);
William A. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEX. L. REV. 399, 410 (1942)
(describing nuisance law as a legal garbage can); Warren A. Seavey, Nuisance:
Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 HARv. L. REV. 984, 984
(1952) (describing nuisance as a mystery)).
174 See, e.g., Halper, supra note 173, at 337-38, 346 (critiquing the
argument
that public nuisance law, which can be adapted post hoc to protect "public
goods," is the appropriate determinant of whether compensation should issue);
Leshy, supra note 36, at 2000-01 (using nuisance law as a justification for taking
water rights without compensation). Notably, the authors of the Prosser on Torts
series recognized the impenetrability of nuisance law in aid of condemning its
application in cases in which "the defendant's interference with the plaintiffs
interests is characterized as a 'nuisance,' and there is nothing more to be said,"
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 86, at
616-17 (5th ed. 1984), which is the purpose to which Halper et al. put it.
175 In the context of speech and speech rights, for instance, doctrines against
obscenity, libel, blasphemy and sedition predated the Constitution. The First
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law articulated with reference to property at the time of the
property's creation, not a meta-principle that nuisance law is
infinitely malleable in the future. 1 76 In the face of an explicit
property right to do what is being done, nuisance doctrine cannot
evolve to take that right without compensation. 1 77

Moreover,

nuisance claims that do not entail takings compensation result only
in forbidding a property holder to do a specific178thing with her
property, not the taking of the property right itself.
Amendment worked to curtail the effects of some of these doctrines in the
American Republic, however, and to foreclose the application of others,
removing the issues from legislative legerdemain. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) ("The very purpose of a Bill of
Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life,
liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and
assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they
depend on the outcome of no elections"); see also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991).
176 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (stating that government "may resist
compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the
owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to
begin with" and that roving, malleable concern about environmental interests
may not be read backward into the title) (emphasis added); see also Rose, supra
note 41, at 276 ("As the Lucas Court remarked, the mere invocation of 'public
nuisance' is not an excuse for public appropriation of private property. Indeed it
never was ...").
177 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028-29; see also James S. Burling, Protecting
PropertyRights in Aquatic Resources After Lucas, SB99 ALI-ABA 349, 375-76
(1997) ("Once a government sees fit to create a property right, that right cannot
be later abrogated or taken away at whim-unless just compensation is paid and
there is due process.") (citing Dows v. Nat'l Exch. Bank of Milwaukee, 91 U.S.
618, 637 (1875) ("The owner of personal property cannot be divested of his
ownership without his consent, except by process. of law.")); West River Bridge
Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 532 (1848) ("[I]t is undeniable that the investment of
property in the citizen by the government, whether made for a pecuniary
consideration or founded on conditions of civil or political duty, is a contract
between the State... and the grantee; and both parties thereto are bound in good
faith to fulfill it."). Cf Rose, supra note 41, at 275 ("[C]ompensation was not
due when regulation effectively prevented private owners from doing something
to which they were not entitled. Thus traditional American law did not
necessarily regard land ownership as a license for a landowner's unrestricted
'piggybacked' use of adjacent diffuse resources such as water, air, or wildlife,
particularly in situations in which one landowner's use could have serious effects
on many other owners and persons." (emphasis added)); id.at 276 ("And unless
a private use was officially authorized as a net public benefit, a private owner's
appropriation of diffuse but congested resources was considered an act of unjust
encroachment, which could be abated as a public nuisance." (emphasis added)).
178 See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
138
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In the case of water rights, the doctrine of nuisance was
effectively constitutionalized, regularized, and fixed by the
beneficial-use rule. Uses that are recognized as beneficial by the
granting of a right are acceptable; those that are not are nuisances
that can be curtailed. By definition, a use (both as to type and as to
manner/amount) that was sanctioned at the time the right vested
could not have been a nuisance. Nuisance law can continue to
play a role in regulating use of water rights in ways that do not
defeat the constitutionally protected right of use, but it cannot take
the right without compensation.
Also fatally flawed are claims that "no one can obtain a
property right to pollute,"' 179 and thus that compensation can be
defeated by defining the uses for which right-holders enjoy a
property right (i.e., use of a water right as originally deemed
beneficial) as pollution.18 0 Again, latter-day doctrinal expansion
cannot defeat constitutional guarantees. Additionally, the maxim
that there is no right to pollute or there is a right to be free of
pollution is not a true statement of law.181 It arises only and
(1978); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 593 (1962); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410-12 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 67374 (1887); Rose, supra note 41, at 282-83 (citing Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. at 404-414). Even in the example of a nuclear power plant discovered to lie
atop a fault line, the permissible uncompensable injury is that the plant owner
will be forced to relocate its operation, while keeping its land for other purposes,
not that its fixtures and land will all be taken without compensation. See Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1029. And even this limited uncompensated injury is possible only
because the power plant owner did not have a specific property right to maintain
a power plant in exactly that location. Leshy asserts the reverse-that nuisance
law will justify non-compensated property taking-but his support belies his
proposition. See Leshy, supra note 36, at 2000-01 (supporting the claim that
water rights can be taken without compensation by demonstrating that a single,
specific use of a property may be enjoined, though the property is not taken,
"ordinarily" without compensation); see also Laitos, supra note 142, at 921.
179 Sax, Constitution, supra note 16, at 273. See also Johnson, supra
note
102, at 485 ("The 'takings' issue should not be troublesome because no one, not
even prior appropriators, has or can acquire a legal right to pollute public
waters."); id. at 488 ("The law has never recognized a vested property right to
pollute."); Sax, Reportorial Fragment, supra note 127, at 2383 ("[M]ight the
Court find that the irrigator's property rights were qualified.., by the
proposition that no one can obtain a property right to denature a stream so as to
exterminate one of its indigenous species.").
180 See Sax, Constitution, supra note 16, at 273-74.
181Sax provides no precedent or explanation in support of the assertion. See
Sax, Constitution, supra note 16, at 273. Johnson cites 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS,
JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER 141-42 (1986). See Johnson, supra
note 102, at 488 n. 14. The cite is not only inapposite, but actually contradicts the

Imaged withHeinOnline
Permission
N.Y.U.
Environmental
-- 17from
N.Y.U.
Envtl. L.J.
1105 2008-2009Law Journal

N.Y U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Volume 17

explicitly with regard to riparian water rights, and even then is
only short-hand for the actual legal doctrine: "Water pollution is a
disfavored use under riparian law" by various presumptions and
conventions. 182 As such, the maxim does not at all speak to
western water-law systems or water rights.' 83 Nor does it suggest
that a use granted constitutional and statutory property-right status
can be proscribed simply by labeling the protected activity
"pollution." Even in riparian jurisdictions, statutory protections of
an activity (that does not enjoy constitutional property-right status)
decrease a court's willingness
to declare the activity an
1 84
impermissible act of pollution.'
Legal reality and basic constitutional theory ratify this
conclusion. Cap-and-trade permits, for instance, expressly create
rights to pollute, demonstrating that such a creature is not
impossible of legal construction. 185 More importantly, the western
states, as noted, created property rights in water that explicitly
permitted,
for
instance,
dewatering
of some
natural
watercourses.1 86 If that activity is now defined as "pollution," then
assertion. See infra this section.
182 1 RODGERS, supra note 181, § 2.19 at 141.
183 See also Sax, Limits of Private Rights, supra note 32, at 475 ("There
is no
legal or logical difference between poisoning fish by what you put in the water
and suffocating them by what you take out. The question for both irrigators and
industrialists is whether one can acquire a property right to destroy an aquatic
system ....Polluting industries learned long ago that the answer is no; one may
not acquire a property right to kill the fish in a river."). Of course, the irrigators
and other western water-right holders do have a vested property right to dewater,
concomitant with the size of their water rights. Simply refusing to acknowledge
the difference does not eviscerate it. Meanwhile, it defies reality to claim that no
property right can issue if an incidental effect of employing the property fight
would be the killing of animals. Any development or use of land or water
property will kill some animals, as Well as some plants. Hunting licenses,
meanwhile, though not property rights per se, are explicit rights to kill animals.
Sax's ungrounded claim, then, is demonstrably false, and if true would eviscerate
all property rights. Once again, this interpretation arises, at least in part, from
conflating riparian with western rights. See supra Part I.D.
184 Sax, Limits of PrivateRights, supra note 32, at 147-48.
'85 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 41, at 297 (citing Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 401, 104 Stat. 2399, 2584 (1990) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 7651-7651o (Supp. V 1993))).
186 See, e.g., Grant, supra note 20, at 462-63 (noting that early western-state
cases allowed "appropriation of the entire flow of the stream"); Sax, Reportorial
Fragment,supra note 127, at 2385 ("Nothing in the laws of most states appears
to prevent diverters from dewatering a river in order to put its waters to other,
out-of-stream beneficial uses."). Blumm points to Grant's recognition that these
cases "concerned issues other than limiting appropriations to protect public trust
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it follows that property rights to do what can later be described as
pollution, can in fact be created. This, of course, illustrates the
incoherence of the maxim: any property right could be defeated
simply by labeling use of the right "polluting." 187
No
constitutional protections can have meaning if affixing a new label
(a label, moreover, that is entirely a stranger to the constitutional
provisions at issue) to the subject matter of the protection can
defeat it. 188 As with nuisance, actual pollution regulation can
occur, but not uncompensated takings under, the banner of
pollution regulation.
Thus, for instance, state government (or the federal
government, to the extent of its constitutional authority over such
matters) may set a cap on the amount of a given chemical that can
be released into the state's water supply-or may prohibit release
of that chemical at all. This regulation would apply equally to all
water uses within the state-including uses by water-right holders.
If the current irrigation methods of a right holder result in release
into the water supply of more of the given chemical than is
permitted under the regulation, she will be obliged to alter her
behavior to accommodate the restriction. Her right to use the
amount of water vested by her appropriation, however, remains
intact. 181
By contrast, if a relevant government effectively cancels a
water right, or some portion of it, to transfer the use of the water
from the right holder's beneficial use to some other use (e.g., a
newly recognized ecological use), then a taking of the right (or
some portion of it) has ensued. As a constitutional result,
uses," suggesting that the case would have been different had such uses been
considered. Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 36, at 714 n.97. But this
presupposes that the "public trust uses" that Blumm articulates (i.e., ecological
uses) were public trust uses in contemplation when the cases were decided, or
that state constitutions do not preclude recognition of such uses for purposes of
compensation denial. As has been demonstrated, both of those presumptions are
inaccurate.
187 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 102, at 506 (proposing exactly that).
" See infra Part III.
189 This is not to say that all regulations that avoid rising to the level of
physical takings will be immune from compensation or will be permitted without
appropriate attention to the vested interests of rights holders. See, e.g., Rose,
supra note 41, at 285 (recognizing that "takings and due process considerations
typically have required that pre-existing uses be 'grandfathered' into new
legislation aimed at protecting public rights"); see also, e.g., Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-29 (1992).
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compensation must issue.' 90

This clear division between regulation and taking is not
confused by the fact that a right holder's ability to draw the whole
of his water right will depend on contingent factors such as
seasonal precipitation and whether other right holders take full
advantage of their rights. 19' Nor is it disturbed by the fact that
190 Sax compares taking a portion of a water right (for transfer of the water to
other uses) to "tighten[ing] up air emission standards for existing facilities
because there is only so much assimilative capacity available in the ambient air."
Sax, Constitution, supra note 16, at 266. He later compares such a taking (for instream uses) to forbidding industrial water pollution. See id. at 272-74. Each
time the distinction that Sax fails to recognize is that the water right holder has a
specific right to withdraw the relevant quantity of water for the use to which he
puts it, whereas the polluter described has no such right (whether to the air or
water). Again, the argument conflates riparianism and appropriation. Moreover,
even if each act in Sax's examples implicated the equivalent of western water
rights (i.e., a constitutionally protected right to use X amount of Y good), Sax's
construction conflates two different kinds of government orders. Requiring users
not to release pollutant Z into the water supply, while not curtailing or
prohibiting the user's use of the water generally, is different than forbidding
users from using water at all (whether because of fears that Z might be released
into the water supply or for any other reason). While Sax may claim he cannot
see the distinction, see Sax, Constitution, supra note 16, at 273-74, it is plain.
And though the difference may not matter in some regulatory contexts, it matters
intensely where the user has a constitutionally protected right to use the water.
When such a right is at stake, the former government order is a regulation, the
latter is a taking. See also Laitos, supra note 142, at 906, 911 (conflating
decreasing or eliminating "a property right to divert or store a specific quantity of
water" with regulation of the right); Leshy, supra note 36, at 1991-92 (equating
taking of water right for ecological uses. to zoning regulations); id. at 2020-21
(equating taking to government action that incidentally affects the price of
private property); Sax, Constitution,supra note 16, at 280.
191 Leshy argues that takings-compensation protection is undercut because,
inter alia: an environmental group could buy land near the stream from which an
irrigator's water comes, drill a well on it, withdraw groundwater, and pipe the
water downstream to provide in-stream water for ecological purposes; and other
users are permitted to collect rainwater that might otherwise run into the right
holder's collection point. See Leshy, supra note 36, at 1988-90. This does not
follow. The relevant inquiry for takings analysis is whether the government has
taken a right, not whether some party could act in a way that derogates from an
otherwise more fulsome employment of a right. The government cannot take an
individual's house without compensation because, for example, should new
neighbors buy the next plot over and build on it, the owner would find herself
more limited in her uses of her property. Nor can the government take a property
right without compensation because -it could (i.e., by acting like the
environmental group in the example above) buy the right to use the property in
its preferred manner. Buying the right to use the property in the (public)buyer's
preferred manner is exactly what eminent domain (i.e., takings with
compensation) is. The fact that government could employ eminent domain
cannot provide an argument that it therefore does not have to.

Imaged withHeinOnline
Permission
N.Y.U.
Environmental
-- 17from
N.Y.U.
Envtl. L.J.
1108 2008-2009Law Journal

2009]

UNBEARABLE COST OF SKIPPING THE CHECK

some private water rights are granted with conditions, including
the condition in some jurisdictions that government permission
need sometimes be sought before changing uses. The right holder
192
in these situations must attend to the conditions and obligations,
but the government must as well, and cannot take the water as long
as the conditions are followed, nor withhold approval
as a means
93
of effecting an otherwise compensable taking. 1
In sum: western-state water-property rights were articulated in
state constitutions and statutes, and states' obligation to pay

compensation when they take property rights arise from both state
and federal constitutions.
Other provisions textured the
development and issuance of water rights in various ways, ensured
that water rights could be regulated by the state, and served as
markers to ensure that water-right dispensation remained within
state (rather than federal) authority. These provisions did not,
though, obviate the water-right or compensation provisions of the
192See Benson, supra note 2 passim (considering, and perhaps overstating,
conditions attached to federal project water); Leshy, supra note 36, at 1995 &
n.31.
193 It has been suggested that "the essence of a water right is priority and use,
and not the right to a specific quantity of water," and thus that water takings are
permissible so long as "either the priority or use of the permit applicant's
appropriation" are not interfered with. Laitos, supra note 142, at 906-07. As the
discussion above indicates, however, the terms of the water right are usually "Y
quantity of water," whether explicitly delineated or the "duty" appropriate at the
time of vesting "to achieve X purpose." Both of these terms are material. If the
government wished to, in essence, buy out the quantity term, then compensation
would have to issue for the modification of the right. See, e.g., Almota Farmers
Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1973) ("The
owner is to be put in the same position monetarily as he would have occupied if
his property had not been taken.. . and is entitled to the fair market value of his
property at the time of the taking."). But see, e.g., Leshy, supra note 36, at
2007-08 (citing Tahoe-Sierra to justify the notion that physical taking analysis
applies only if "the government's measures to protect fish... completely and
permanently prohibit you from exercising your water right"); id. at 2011-12
(claiming that Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982) does not apply because "the physical occupation must be permanent," and
is not permanent if recurring and not wholly predetermined of size); id. at 201213, 2020. See also Grant, supra note 20, at 430 (questioning whether noncontinuous but repetitive takings of water would be considered permanent, and
concluding that "no definitive answer exists" as to the Court's position, without
citing Dugan); Marcus J. Lock, Note, Braving the Waters of Supreme Court
Takings Jurisprudence:Will the Fifth Amendment Protect Western Water Rights
from FederalEnvironmental Regulation?, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 76, 99110 (2000) (asserting the same).
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constitutions. Because these are constitutional provisions, they
pretermit application of antecedent common-law doctrines
(particularly common-law doctrines arising from riparian, rather
than western, jurisdictions) at variance with the provisions, and
foreclose the development of contradictory subsequent doctrine.
As a result, western states have the authority to regulate water-use
rights, or to take them with compensation, but not to take them
without compensation.
Some western states have developed state public trust
In these doctrinal
doctrines during the last forty years.
explications the states have ratified, rather than undermined, their
constitutional duties to respect water rights and compensation
obligations. 194 Thus in North Dakota the doctrine requires
"analysis of present supply and future need" before "alienation and
allocation" of any further resources, not uncompensated taking of
extant water rights. 195 In Montana, the doctrine, grounded in the
state's constitution, permits public use of surface waters capable of
recreational use. 1 96 In the case establishing the doctrine, though,
the Montana Supreme Court explicitly recognized that the plaintiff
had no claim to the water at issue-and implied that if such 97a
claim had been presented, a taking action would have arisen.
Utah has also explicitly recognized that application of the public
trust does not extinguish the state's obligation to pay takings
compensation.198

Other western states have likewise failed to

endorse a public trust doctrine 99(or any other device) of a
compensation-stripping character.
194

It will be remembered that California's unique development requires

independent consideration. See supra text accompanying notes 19, 20, and 21.
195 United Plainsmen Ass'n v. State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247
N.W.2d 457, 463 (N.D. 1976).
196 See Gait v. Dep't of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, 731 P.2d 912, 913 (Mont.
1987); Montana Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170-71

(Mont. 1984).

197 See Curran, 682 P.2d at 171. Cf Gait, 731 P.2d at 916 ("Only that use

which is necessary for the public to enjoy its ownership of the water resource
will be recognized as within the easement's scope. The real property interests of
private landowners are important as are [sic] the public's property interest in
water.").
Colman v. State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 635 (Utah 1990).
198
199See
See Owsichek v. State Guide Licensing and Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488,
494 (Alaska 1988) (holding that waterways are available for common use while
remaining in a natural state); State ex rel. State Game Comm'n v. Red River
Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421, 428 (N.M. 1945) (extending public interest only to

N.Y.U.
Environmental
Imaged withHeinOnline
Permission
-- 17from
N.Y.U.
Envtl. L.J.
1110 2008-2009Law Journal

20091

UNBEARABLE COST OF SKIPPING THE CHECK

II. THE PLACE OF WATER RIGHTS WITHIN TAKINGS ANALYSIS

As has been seen, western water rights are property rights
amenable to takings-compensation protection. Given this, if
current takings analysis would leave taking of these rights
uncompensated, this shows the deficiencies of modem takingsanalysis methodology, not the water rights. Some scholars have
gotten this relationship backward: they have looked at current
takings doctrine, concluded that it would not result in
compensation for water-right takings, and thereby concluded that
western water rights must not be compensable rights. 200 In fact,
though, this dilemma is a false one: water-rights takings fit neatly
into current doctrine as physical takings, and are straightforwardly
subject to compensation.2 °1
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan20 2 the Supreme Court

reviewed the distinction between physical and regulatory takings.
It explained that "when the character of [a] governmental
action.., is a permanent physical occupation of property, our
cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the
extent of permitting fishing access to non-navigable water); Morse v. State, 590
P.2d 709, 711 (Or. 1979) (explicating a constrained and non-compensationdenying understanding of the public-trust doctrine consistent with the
interpretation provided in Part I.B. supra);.Rettkowski v. Dep't of Ecology, 858
P.2d 232, 239-40 (Wash. 1993) (limiting application of public trust doctrine to
navigable streams, consistent with navigation servitude); Day v. Armstrong, 362
P.2d 137, 145, 151 (Wyo. 1961) (recognizing easement for floatation on nonnavigable waterways while such waters remain in natural state).
Idaho

recognizes that "[t]he public trust doctrine takes preceden[ce] even over vested
water rights," Kootenai Envtl Alliance Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671
P.2d 1085, 1094 (Idaho 1983), but has also recognized that "the public trust
doctrine is not an element of a water right," Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v.
State, 911 P.2d 748, 750 (Idaho 1995), and has not suggested that "taking
precedence" could eliminate takings compensation rather than triggering it.
Meanwhile, 1996 legislation prohibited application of the public trust doctrine to
water rights. See IDAHo CODE ANN. § 58-1203(2)(b) (2008). The Arizona
Supreme Court struck down the Arizona legislature's effort to ensure that the
court "shall not make a determination as to whether public trust values are
associated with any or all of the river system[s] or source," because the doctrine
is a constitutional limit on legislative power, but did not rule that takingscompensation protection could be stripped from vested property rights. See San
Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999)
(invalidating ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-263(B) (2003).
200

See Sax, Constitution, supra note 16 passim.

201 See generally Grant, supra note

142, at 1361-72 (discussing recent Federal
Claims Court cases considering this question, reviewing scholarship in the area,
and tentatively concluding largely in accord with this section).
202 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an
important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on
the owner., 20 3 Opponents of compensation have recognized that
treating water takings as physical takings would cripple their
position. 204 They have failed, however, to recognize that the Court
has in fact already settled the issue in favor of compensation-a
conclusion consistent with the nature of water rights and of
constitutional protections generally.
In Dugan v. Rank,2 °5 for instance, the Court found that the
federal government had taken water-districts' use rights by
diminishing their access to San Joaquin River water by collecting
it behind Friant Dam.2 °6 The Dugan Court explained that
[t]he right claimed here is to the continued flow of water...
and to its use.... A seizure of water rights need not necessarily
be a physical invasion of land.... Interference with or partial
taking of water rights in the manner it was accomplished here
might be analogized to interference or partial taking of air space
over land ....

Therefore, when the Government acted here with

the purpose and effect of subordinating the respondents' water
rights to the Project's uses whenever it saw fit, with the result
of depriving the owner of its profitable use there was the
imposition of such a servitude as would constitute an
appropriation
of property for which compensation should be
°7
made.

This concise paragraph answered-in advance-many of the
objections later raised against compensation for water-right
takings. It recognized that the property at issue is the water itself,
not the land on which the water is going to be used. (Invasion of
that land would constitute a separate physical taking). Thus, when
the government orders that the water be redirected from the right
holder's uses to the government's uses, it has taken physical
command-or physical occupancy--of the property for its own
purposes.
It makes no doctrinal difference whether the
government achieves its occupancy through employees' efforts (as

203

Id. at 434-35 (internal citations & quotation marks omitted).

204 See, e.g., Leshy, supra note 36, at 2009; Sax, Constitution,supra note 16,

at 258-59, 263.
205 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
206 Id. at 613-14.
207 Id. at 625 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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in Dugan), through third parties, or by orders to right holders.2 °8
Nor could this distinction make any difference as a matter of sense
or justice: if the government can defeat property (or any other)
constitutional protection of individual liberty merely by requiring a
citizen's own assistance in surrendering the liberty in question,
then no liberties can be of any value.
Moreover, Dugan recognized that the water right is a right to
use a flow; thus a "temporary" occupation for certain periods
"whenever [the government] sees fit" qualifies as a compensable
physical taking-because it is not really a temporary taking at all.
This is so because the water right contains at core an inextricable
temporal function: it is the right to draw an amount of water
through a period of time. If the government temporarily restricts
an owner's access to his gold mine, it has not, at the end of that
period of temporary restriction, reduced the total amount of gold
remaining in the mine. 20 9 If the government temporarily restricts a
U.S. at 427 & n.5 ("[A] permanent physical occupation of
real property" arises as "[t]he one incontestable case for compensation (short of
formal expropriation).., when the government deliberately brings it about that
its agents... regularly use, or permanently occupy, space or a thing which
theretofore was understood to be under private ownership." (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Int'l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399, 407 (1931)
(holding that compensable taking arises when government issues order curtailing
right holder's ability to draw and use water for private purposes); Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 172 (1871) ("It is not necessary that property
should be absolutely taken, in the narrowest sense of that word, to bring the case
within the protection of this constitutional provision. There may be such serious
interruption to the common and necessary use of property as will be equivalent to
a taking, within the meaning of the Constitution. The backing of water so as to
overflow the lands of an individual, or any other superinduced addition of water,
earth, sand, or other material or artificial structure placed on land, if done under
statutes authorizing it for the public benefit, is such a taking as by the
constitutional provision demands compensation."). Also of relevance: the Court
particularly objects to physical occupations that forbid private landowners from
keeping the public from using their property. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 178-79. (1979). It is by use that water-right holders exclude others; thus,
forbidding use (and commandeering the water for public uses) explicitly works
an occupation that destroys the right holder's ability to exclude. All of this
defeats. Leshy's claims that the government can avoid physical-taking liability
simply by ordering property rights holders not to exercise their property right, or
refusing to honor their property right. See Leshy, supra note 36, at 2012-13.
209 This is an example of a temporary occupation recognized by the Loretto
court. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 431-32. Notably, the temporary occupation was only
"justified by the exigency of war." Id. at 432. See also United States v. Cent.
Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) ("Thus the WPB made a reasoned
decision that, under existing circumstances, the Nation's need was such that the
208 See Loretto, 458
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water right holder's ability to draw his flow of water, however, it
has permanently extinguished his ability to take the lost water
(unless it replaces that water with water from a separate source at
its own expense). 210 Thus, claims that Loretto and physical-taking
analysis do not apply to water rights 2 1 fail because they neither
account for the nature of water or the water right, nor consider the
water right within the context provided by Loretto, Dugan and
related precedent.
III. PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR VALID
COMPENSABLE PROPERTY RIGHTS

The analysis in the previous sections established the invalidity
of arguments that western water rights do not merit the status of
compensation-protected property rights. Left to be considered is
the question of whether the secure legal status of private water

unrestricted use of mining equipment and manpower in gold mines was so
wasteful of wartime resources that it must be temporarily suspended.... War,
particularly in modern times, demands the strict regulation of nearly all
resources.
It makes demands which otherwise would be insufferable.").
Similarly, a temporary moratorium on building while a government determines
what regulatory action to take merely delays the fulsome use of land property; it
does not destroy any of the stock of land and does not place the land in uses
preferred by the government in the interim. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe
Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 306, 337-38 (2002) (holding that a
"moratorium on development imposed during the process of devising a
comprehensive land-use plan [does not] constitute[] a per se taking of property
requiring compensation..."); see also Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States,
296 F.3d 1339, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that a temporary restriction on
logging while permit pending, which was not pled to cause deterioration in the
stock of timber, "cannot cause a compensable taking"). The proper analogy of
water takings to the Tahoe-Sierra moratorium would be for the preservation
council to have instituted the moratorium-and, at the moratorium's end, seized
a third of the private land that had been under the moratorium for use as a
wildlife preserve; or opened the whole of the private land to public camping, but
allowed the land owners to camp there, too. These actions, of course, would
raise physical-taking compensation obligations. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018-19.
210 This is not an option often considered in the literature with regard to
government takings of water. It should, however, present no difficulties, and
should be permitted on the same basis as "physical solution" (or right of
replacement, or substitute supply) settlements in which junior private users may
provide a substitute supply, or improve a senior's "diversion, distribution, and
use at a junior's expense." Harrison C. Dunning, The 'Physical Solution' in
Western Water Law, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 445, 447, 482 (1986). See also 2
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 5, §§ 12.02(e) at 12-61 to 12-63,
14.04(c)(3) at 14-57 to 14-60.
211See supra note 193.

Imaged withHeinOnline
Permission
N.Y.U.
Environmental
-- 17from
N.Y.U.
Envtl. L.J.
1114 2008-2009Law Journal

2009]

UNBEARABLE COST OF SKIPPING THE CHECK

1115

rights presents a cause for celebration. Scholars have variously
asserted that considerations arising from the nature of water, the
necessities of environmental protection, and the obligations of
justice disfavor private water rights. As will be demonstrated
below, however, public policy favors not only respecting western
water rights, but strengthening and expanding the western waterright system.
A.

The Nature of Water

Many arguments against private property interests in water
arise from the claim that water differs uniquely from all other
substances in ways that render private rights in water
fundamentally improper or revocable without compensation. In
fact, though, water is not fundamentally different than noncontroversially privatizable goods.
The most fundamental claim of arguments that water is
uniquely different than other goods is that water is specially
necessary to human and other life.21 2 This, however, simply is not
true. Human life requires space in which to live, food, shelter,
raiment, energy, and other needs as surely as it requires water.
Most obviously, it requires land as much as water, for living space
and for most food, shelter, clothing and energy production, and
21 3
land, of course, is entirely amenable to private ownership.
Human life also requires all of the other necessities listed above.
And while there are, in most instances, multiple sources of energy
or food or shelter, so that they are intra-categorically fungible, the
categories of need are not themselves fungible, and the whole
panoply of goods available for provision of the need category are
privatizable and privately owned. Similarly, while there is only
212 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 38, at 1819, 1859-60.
213Multiple-story dwellings hardly negate the need for land on which to live,
but merely demonstrate efficient use of a privately owned good: the multiple
stories still rest on a foundation of land. Similarly, while not every individual
must own or have access to land for food to be generated, the land on which food
is generated is privately owned, the food itself is privately owned, and consumers
purchase it through markets. See MyrI L. Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle of
Sticks: Land as a Community-Based Resource, 32 ENVTL. L. 773, 798 (2002).
Support is sometimes provided to assist needy consumers, but such assistanceand the need for food itself-hardly eviscerates the whole property structure, or
the possibility of property rights in land or food. See, e.g., Robert Glennon,
Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1873, 1896
(2005) ("[R]ecognizing a human right to water does not resolve the issue of
privatization; indeed, it begs the question.").
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one good (water) to satisfy the relevant need category (water),
there are multiple sources of water just as there are multiple
sources of shelter, clothing and fuel.
Water is in certain senses fungible, reusable, mobile, and not
entirely predictable. 14 Individual molecules of water, after use,
will flow away,2 15 or will evaporate and rain down again, and then
be available for reuse somewhere else. But this difference
between water and more solid goods is accounted for in the
usufructuary property-right system that appends to water. As
noted above, ownership of individual molecules of water would do
little good. But a property right to use a flow of water accounts for
fungibility and reusability. Similarly, the right to use a flow of
water is in a sense renewable, in that the flow will continue,
subject to contingencies of weather and other natural processes.
But this renewability differentiates water in no way from other
private and privatizable renewable resources, such as timber,
which with proper management regenerate, subject to natural
vagaries such as weather.
Water, too, does have a role to play as "part of a larger
entity-the earth., 2 16 It is an important part of the global
ecosystem. So, of course, are all other products and constituents of
the earth, rather by definition. All resources, like water, are "part
of our common capital, from which we sustain our limited capacity
217
to furnish the means for our common survival and well-being.'
Virtually all of these resources, though, have been subjected to
private ownership and are amenable to privatization. Water is not,
in this respect or for this reason, meaningfully different. To the
extent that this argument has any power, it is to suggest that water
is particularly unamenable to private control because water is a
particularly vital common capital stock. But this logic would
necessarily advocate stripping private control from entities in
proportion to their centrality as "common capital" (presumably

214

See Denise Lach, Helen Ingram & Steve Rayner, Maintainingthe Status

Quo: How Institutional Norms and Practices Create Conservative Water
Organizations, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2027, 2030 (2005) (describing water as
unpredictable); Laitos, supra note 142, at 905 (describing water as storable and
mobile); Leshy, supra note 36, at 1995 (describing water rights as "mobile,
fungible and reusable").
215 See Leshy, supra note 36, at 1995; Rose,
216 Sax, Constitution, supra note 16, at 281.
217 Id. at 282.

supra note 41, at 271.
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their value as capital to human development as well as to
ecological function) and their effect on the earth. First among
these would be land-and people themselves.
Beyond all these concrete assertions lies a set of claims about
water as an inherently and necessarily natural thing, and
concomitant claims that property rights may not arise in water
because of this inherent naturalness. 218 All things, though, were
"natural," in the sense of being un-touched by human hands or
minds (though it is not clear why or how humans alone among the
inhabitants of the earth can or should be treated as "unnatural" 2 19)
at one point-water is not unique in this respect. As with most of
those other initially natural goods, water has been removed from
its "natural" condition by the efforts of man on a massive scaleparticularly, in the United States, in the very lands in which
western water law holds sway.
Water, then, is not uniquely "natural." Moreover, like other
once-natural goods, water simply cannot be returned, wholesale, to
its "natural" state (whatever that might mean at this point, after
human activity has shaped the location and condition of the water,
leaving behind forever any notion of what condition would have
obtained to the water absent the human interactions 220 ) without
effectively abandoning human occupation of the areas in
question.12 1 Some scholars may dream of achieving ecological
paradise by preserving "the bulk of' the water in its natural
218

See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 38, at 1832-33.

219 See, e.g., Terry W. Frazier, Protecting Ecological Integrity Within the

BalancingFunction of Property Law, 28 ENVTL. L. 53, 103-04 (1998) (arguing
that people must be treated "as members of the biological community," not
outsiders whose actions are necessarily deviations from biological truth).
220 Cf Frazier, supra note 219, at 101-05 (recognizing that "nature"
is no
stasis to be preserved in one picaresque moment, but naturally morphs, and
explaining that "[b]iologists now know that... [e]cosystems are dynamic and
constantly change in response to natural and man-made disturbances. Natural
disturbances may even be good for ecosystems").
221 See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 213, at 1875 ("Increased demands result
from one simple fact: population growth."); id. at 1882 (detailing the demands of
continuing exponential growth); Daniel McCool, The River Commons: A New
Era in U.S. Water Policy, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1903, 1903-05, 1908-11, 1917-18
(2005) (detailing massive human intrusions into once-"natural" conditions in the
West); A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Western Growth and
Sustainable Water Use: If There Are No "Natural Limits," Should We Worry
About Water Supplies, 27 PuB. LAND & RES. L. REv. 33, 41-47 (2006)
(recognizing inevitability of permanent management, possibly enhanced by
potential climate-change scenarios).
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condition, "while permitting very modest uses at the fringes, as it
were, compatible with the preservation of the whole. 222 This
dream, though, cannot be fulfilled, nor even approximated.
Resources may permit the. preservation of some land and
waterscapes as, essentially, museum-piece replicas of the natural
state of a landscape at some given time, but there is no way to
avoid fundamental alterations from the patterns of flow that would
exist absent human occupation of the western states. Accepting
this fact requires accepting the fact that water will be treated as a
commodity; all that remains is the opportunity to use some of that
commodity to recreate or exemplify "natural" conditions. But
whether that goal is achieved by collective, communal, private, or
mixed ownership and control methods has nothing to do with the
"naturalness" of water, and nothing about the once-natural state of
water dictates the ownership and control regime that should now
apply to water.223
In short, then, to the extent that water is meaningfully
different from other goods, the difference has been accounted for
in the structure of property rights in water-most notably in the
usufructuary nature of the property right and in the navigation
servitude that applies to waters insofar as those waters provide the
stuff of public thoroughfares. 4 Because this uniqueness has
already been accounted for, it cannot even in theory provide,
additionally, an excuse for eviscerating the very property system
that has taken account of the differences. To the extent that water
is not different from other goods, meanwhile, the argument that
water rights can and should be revoked without compensation is
nothing more than an entering-wedge argument that all property
rights-and, inescapably, all human rights, given the place of
people in the ecosystem and the prevalence of ecology-based

222 Rose, supra note 28, at 360. See also Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 36,

at 711-12 (praising a compensation-stripping public trust doctrine as
incorporating a "feasibility standard" that "[u]ltimately ... means that trust uses
must be accommodated eventually; it means that public rights must be
fulfilled").
223 See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 213, at 1873-74.
224 Waterways, as has been thoroughly discussed, have served a unique
function through much of history, though less so today, as common highways of
highest efficiency and value. Cf Epstein, supra note 41, at 420 (stating that the
use of waterways as highways is "inherently public," and it is impossible for
society to be better off without this use available).
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arguments in the mix-are liable to the same treatment.225
B.

Ecology & Efficiency

Returning water, in the whole or the main, to its "natural"
flows in the western states is a practical impossibility. So too is
removing human oversight and control from the distribution of
water in these areas. It is possible, however, to increase the
amount of water dedicated to ecologically beneficial and naturalstate-regarding uses. Accepting this as a valid goal .does not,
however, determine which methods of water control or forms of
water law would best promote ecological dedication and use. A
loud chorus insists--or simply presumes-that the collective form
of control would best serve, and so advocates shifting to such

control (without payment of compensation to private rights
holders) to maximize environmental dedication. 226 The chorus,
though, sings the wrong tune. In fact, water rights are essential to

maximizing ecologically beneficial use of water.
The primary reason for this is simple. The advantage of
compensation-denial and water-right destruction, from the vantage
of ecological-use supporters, is that it would allow the government

to seize property-protected waters for ecological uses without
having to pay anything. No doubt this would be the result in the
short run: water would flow away from private right holders to
ecological purposes faster than it would if water rights had to be
condemned and purchased through eminent domain.
The short-run advantages of this strategy, however, would
225

See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 213, at 796-807. Cf Epstein, supra note 41,

at 412 n.1 ("The newer approach to the public trust doctrine is simply another
unfortunate effort to create instability in private rights, in harmony with the
modem efforts to eviscerate the eminent domain clause."); Smith & Sweeney,
supra note 36, at 325 ("If a state merely needs a [public] interest to expand the
limits of the [public] trust... what is to prevent a state from expanding the trust
to avoid a takings claim in any situation?"). Contra Sax 1933B, supra note 36,
at 1452-53 (advocating a general rule allowing uncompensated taking of
property).
226 See, e.g., Grant, supra note 20, at 424 & n. 13 (cataloging articles
in which
"[m]any commentators have applauded use of the public trust doctrine to
reallocate water from existing appropriations to trust uses without payment of
just compensation to the appropriators"); Sax, Limits of Private Rights, supra
note 32, at 473-74 (advocating taking without compensation for ecological
purposes simply because "public values have changed"); Barton H. Thompson,
Jr., Water Law as a Pragmatic Exercise: Professor Joseph Sax's Water
Scholarship,25 Ecology L.Q. 363, 370-71 (1998).
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soon be swamped by its longer-term disadvantages. First, the
destruction of water rights would also destroy any meaningful way
of protecting and preserving the ecological-use status of any water.
All water would be in the full control of the government, including
water temporarily freed for ecological use. This means, ultimately,
that the allocation of water would be an entirely majoritarian
determination. History and theory demonstrate that, in part
because the majority of public sentiment arises from the everburgeoning urban population concentrations, majoritarian control
of water resources results in directing water inexpensively toward
urban uses.227

The problem

will be exacerbated because

destroying water rights will destroy the most effective-and only
majority-checking-means of charging a market-related price for
the use of water, and thus creating natural incentives to
conservation and limits on growth. If water is market pricedsomething only possible under a rights-based regime-urban
growth and use will be checked by increasing prices. 228 Ifwater
rights are destroyed, the only charge that will be placed on water
use will be the one affixed by government (again, ultimately, by
the majority of users). There is virtually no chance that the price
set will equal what would be the market price, if there were a
market.229
The longer this condition continues, the more
dependent these growing cities will become on under-priced water,
the greater the urban usage will be, and the smaller will be the
reserve for non-urban uses. While compensation-deniers might
assert that "[u]rban users will also have to adopt more efficient
227

Witness the fact that municipal water suppliers charge only a "cost of

service" covering the cost of water delivery, but pay (and charge) nothing for
water itself, and that many urban areas in the arid West do not meter water. See
Glennon, supra note 213, at 1883-84; see generally Cohen, supra note 46, at 262
("[T]he will of the majority is, from a social wealth prospective, quite different
from the general interest."); Harbison, supra note 144, at 551-53 (describing the
perils of marketless governmental goods distribution); Lach, Ingram & Rayner,
supra note 214, at 2032-34 (describing institutional rejection of market (or more
than minimal) pricing within public water-control agencies); Tarlock & Van de
Wetering, supra note 221, at 35-39 (detailing priorities and advantages that
growth-oriented urban areas enjoy).
228 Glennon, supra note 213, at 1883-84; see also id. at 1881-82 (discussing
the resistance to municipal effluent re-use arising from "squeamishness"). A
functioning market system would overcome such squeamishness by raising the
price of non re-used water relative to re-used water. See generally 2 WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS supra note 5, § 14.01(b)(2), at 14-09 to 14-20 (providing an
overview of the. significant scholarly consideration of water markets).
229 See infra Part IV.
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methods as demands to stop waste increase," 230 in reality their
strategy will effectively have destroyed the primary mechanisms
for fostering efficiency and deterring waste among urban (i.e.,
majority) users.23'
The lack of water rights and of market prices and mechanisms
for water would also vastly complicate distribution of water
resources to their most efficient ecological uses. Initial questions
arise: what are the appropriate ecological or "natural" uses?
Tension immediately arises in the western-state context, for
instance, between the assertedly eco-friendly desire for dense
urban living (to allow for greater "natural spaces") and the
similarly eco-endorsed goal of keeping water use. within its
watershed of origin.232 As between similar uses, which will prove
the wisest and most efficient allocation of water per improvement
to the environment? For example, which waterscapes should be
"restored," and which should be "mined"? 233 How much water
230Sax, Limits of Private Rights, supra note 32, at 483; see also Glennon,
supra note 213, at 1902.

231 Even compensation-deniers have recognized that effective, full pricing of
water is necessary to efficient, non-pollutive use of waters. See, e:g., Johnson,
supra note 102, at 502. Johnson makes this admission in concert with a lament
that "water was made available without cost to appropriators" in the beginning.
Id. The initial sale price (even were that sale price zero) of the water has nothing
to do with the ability to establish full market pricing now, though. The justiceregarding aspects of the objection are considered below.
232See, e.g., Sax, Constitution, supra note 16, at 278 (seeming to privilege
less-wasteful out-of-basin uses to "wasteful" in-basin uses, but not unpacking the
determination); Tarlock & Van de Wetering, supra note 221, at 53-56
(considering the tension). Similar dilemmas arise constantly. For instance,
lining the All-American Canal will increase the efficiency of water use, but will
do so by stopping seepages that wet other environmentally sensitive areas and by
depriving Mexico of the drainage. See David J. Guy, A Model Water Transfer

Act for California:An AgriculturalPerspective, 14 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL.

L. & POL'Y 709, 714 (2008). Similarly, "green" energy (e.g., water power)
requires non-"natural" use of resources, such as hydroelectric dams. Merely
invoking the mantle of environmental stewardship will not determine which of
these courses to favor; measures of value and efficiency are required.
233 McCool regrets that "while these [water-control] agencies have gradually
moved into river restoration, they have adamantly resisted giving up any of their
traditional missions, which caused most of the problems in the first place. Thus,
they use federal money to restore some riverine ecosystems while actively doing
damage to others." McCool, supra note 221, at 1927. This behavior, though, is
unavoidable: even accepting as given that the Bureau of Reclamation's damming
and canal projects "would [never] have been undertaken by the private sector
because they made absolutely no economic sense," Glennon, supra note 213, at
1899, or, from a naturalistic point of view, much ecological sense, the fact
remains that the population distribution and economic vitality of the West have
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should be dedicated to preservation and restoration of given
species, and to what level? What other needs should go unfulfilled
to achieve these ends, and why? Is it advisable to mandate a
natural-state-diminishing regulation in order to increase water
conservation? Destroying the means of accurately valuing the
water resources to be employed in any given proposal also
destroys an important tool in making allocation determinations,
and in incentivizing efficient use of those resources. 4 The track
record of public entities attempting to achieve efficient and
innovative use (of water or any other resources) without market
signals and price incentives and discipline is rather dire.235
Destroying water rights also destroys the incentive for private
users to conserve and to invest in efficiency-enhancing
technologies.
If right holders cannot benefit from these
236
improvements, they have little incentive to make the investment.

If right holders cannot even know if they will continue to receive

come to rely on these massive interferences with the natural flow of water, and
that the calls on water are multiplying, not declining. It will thus always be
necessary to select some favored systems for restoration, and to continue to
exploit the rest. Destroying water markets and rights will not obviate this reality;
it will just make it harder to determine how best to allocate resources and how to
maximize values such as restoration and efficiency.
234 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 46, at 247 (stating that the value of just
compensation is as a metric by which to determine whether public or private
ownership of a resource is most efficient).
235 See, e.g., Reed D. Benson, So Much Conflict, Yet So Much in Common:
Considering the Similarities between Western Water Law and the Endangered
Species Act, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 29, 72-73 (2004) (regretting desuetude of
"holistic"--but thus gridlock-ensuring--"Park City Principles"); Cohen, supra
note 46, at 242-43 (stating that increasing communal use, overuse, and scarcity
tends toward increasing value arising from privatization); Glennon, supra note
213, at 1882. See generally Cohen, supra note 38, at 1827 (chronicling the
inefficiencies that characterize public water-control agencies); Lach, Ingram &
Rayner, supra note 214 (same).
236 See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 213, at 1886-88; Grant, supra note 20, at
461 (citing Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 620 (1983); Moyer v. Preston,
44 P. 845, 847 (Wyo. 1896)); Thompson, supra note 226, at 377-79. Cohen
notes that "the idea of a piggybank seems to me to be apt as a more general
descriptor... of the behaviors and norms that are increasingly being called forth
from water users ....These are the multiplicity of actions, each an incremental
part of the whole, through which water, rather than being utilized in countless
careless-to-profligate ways, can get saved parsimoniously ...through the thrifty
behavior of ordinary folks." Cohen, supra note 38, at 1826. Of course, the spur
to piggybank savings is the private and valuable nature of those pennies to the
savers, and the improvement to those individuals' well-being that arises from the
savings. The same is the case with water savings.
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the water to which their right entitles them, they are, to the extent
of the insecurity of the right, actively discouraged from making
any water use-related investments at all. Insecurity will, though,
encourage water users to withdraw as much water as possible from
natural conditions and move it into storage reserves, protecting
themselves against the threat of having their access to water
revoked. Insecurity and uncertainty are the enemies of increased
efficiency for all users.23 7

Additionally, the right-destroying strategy will make it
impossible for communities, organizations, and individuals to
make directed investments in ecological uses of water. Without
water rights, capital cannot be marshaled for dedicated-use water
purposes, nor can restricted-purpose funding partnerships arise.
Rather, only the distinctly second-best option of using capital to
lobby government to continue such uses, as against the calls from
vote-rich urban areas, will be available.
If water rights continue to be respected, in contrast, such
rights can be assigned to ecologically protective purposes,
organizations, and owners. Once this assignment has been made,
the rights will work to protect the water so assigned from being
commandeered for other uses, just as they protect private right
holders. And the continuing value-structure embedded in the
right-ownership regime will foster efficient use by all usersincluding ecological users. Eminent domain permits government
to "control ...hold-out positions, excessive cost impositions, and
other rent-seeking behaviors. 238 It permits government to allocate
as much water to ecological (or any other) uses as the public is
willing to finance. It simply requires paying the just-compensation
check.
In short, if the western water-law system did not already exist,
those truly interested in maximizing allocation of water to
ecologically beneficial purposes would be wise to invent such a
system. It would not look exactly like the current system, but
insofar as it differed it would favor stronger and more-easily
237 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 46, at 275 (stating that modem public trust

theory "undercuts... secure and predictable rights in property"). Cf Rose,
supra note 41, at 273 ("Increasing congestion in common resources... makes it
worth the cost and effort to define property rights more explicitly.").
238 Cohen, supra note 38, at 1855. Cohen claims that avoidance
of such
problems requires "a strong governmental role," id., but eminent domain
provides that public role.
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.alienable water rights, not an absence of rights. 239 And, in fact,
this may be exactly the situation that eastern states find themselves
in as water scarcity such as the West has faced for a century and a
half begins to trouble them.
C.

Justice & Social Cohesion

Denying compensation for water-rights takings would, as
noted, result in the post hoc abridgement of a constitutionally
protected right, establishing the precedent for treating other rights
similarly. 240 Neither justice nor wisdom endorse thus weakening
the structure of constitutional protections. Even ignoring the larger
constitutional implications, however, compensation denial does not
pass the test of justice. Further, by setting the interests of property
owners at odds with the goals of environmental protection, it sows
needless social discord and creates unnecessary barriers to the
achievement of both sets of interests.
As compensation-deniers have recognized, the mandate of
justice that animates the just-compensation obligation is this: the
general public must pay for benefits running to it; it must not be
permitted to thrust the burden of paying for such benefits on
hapless individuals or groups. 241 Yet attempts to take water rights
without compensation to achieve the public good of environmental
protection straightforwardly violate this maxim of justice.242
Some objections to compensation plainly misunderstand the
239

See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 38, at 1840 (critiquing use-or-lose aspect of

rights structure); Rose, supra note 41, at 295-96. See generally 2 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS supra note 5, § 14.01(b)(2)(A), at 14-14 (acknowledging that
"water marketing has been an integral part of the doctrine since its inception and
will assist in adapting the doctrine to meet new social values"). See also infra
Part IV for reform suggestions.
240 See supra Part
II.
241 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 41, at 274-75, 295-96; Sax, Natural Resource
Law, supra note 24, at 479; see also Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960); United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502. (1945).
242 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 38, at 1837 (taking water rights without
compensation is "a damnum absque injuria outcome that I freely translate as: too
bad, so sad"); Huffman, supra note 36, at 572 ("Why not pay? ... [T]he only
explanation is that it is expensive to pay and we would rather get our public
benefits for nothing."). But see Joseph L. Sax, A Public Lecture by Joseph L.
Sax, Environment and Its Mortal Enemy: The Rise and Decline of the Property
Rights Movement, 28 U. HAW. L. REv. 7, 13 (2005) (praising California's
generosity for being "willing to bear part of the burden of protecting listed
species in the [Salton] Sea, rather than putting the economic burden all on
irrigators."(emphasis added)).
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concept. It is not true, for instance, that if takings of water rights
require compensation, "we would all be left more
impoverished., 243 When a government takes a good and pays
compensation, it should be paying as compensation the actual
value of the property right taken. Hence both the government and
the individual should, at the end of the transaction, be in the same
economic position as before. The government's motivation for
initiating the taking, though, should be that the public will gain a
higher aggregate value from ownership of the property right than
the private owner could have gained. 2 " If the government is
correct, then the transaction makes both the previous property
holder and the public better off, because all members of the public
share the additional benefit flowing from the publicness of the
property right. Only if the transaction is one that the government
should never have initiated would it be possible for the public to be
"impoverished" as a result-and if this occurs, the public should
bear the loss, for it is the public's representative (i.e., the
If
government) that demanded the wrong-headed swap.
compensation is not paid, on the other hand, the public may gain a
windfall from the expropriation (just as does someone who leaves
a restaurant before paying the check), but the right-holder will be
impoverished; and all individuals will be impoverished also to the
extent that their own property has been rendered that much more
susceptible to confiscation.
Similar misunderstanding appears in the utilitarian argument
that compensation should and can be denied because "what would
happen is that the government would usually not pay; instead, it
would regulate less." 245 This may well be true. But it is
Leshy, supra note 36, at 2024.
See Epstein, supra note 41, at 418.
Leshy goes on to assert that "[t]he
245 Leshy, supra note 36, at 2024.
government simply cannot raise the money that would be required to compensate
water right holders for limiting the exercise of their water rights-especially in
this era when many people, including many of the country's political leaders,
seem to regard taxation for public programs as a form of theft." Id. This is a
doubly-odd position. Though compensation-deniers often attempt to render their
proposals more palatable by suggesting that the water to be taken will be
"marginal," see id. at 2017, 2023, here Leshy seemingly envisions massive
takings, else paying compensation would not entail such massive expenditures.
Additionally, Leshy argues that since the public does not want to pay for water
rights, the government should on the public's behalf take the rights outright,
without compensation-and that a public that thinks that taxation is theft will
have no objection to having outright theft undertaken in their name by their
243
244
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consonant-not discordant-with justice to require that society
pay for what it gets, and get only what it pays for. This is, in fact,
simply a restatement of the principle of justice at the core of
eminent domain.
The injustice of non-compensation is challenged by
arguments that rights holders did not pay enough for the water
rights to begin with, or that they are earning windfall profits from
the additional increment of value added to their land by the
availability of water, or that their use of water consistent with the
bargain struck in their water rights represents, by modem lights,
immoral waste.2 46 The terms of property rights, however, were set
by the government (i.e., the public). 247 In response to these terms,
individuals undertook the efforts envisaged by the government,
met their side of the deal, and received their water rights. As
Illinois Central rightly teaches, the minimum obligation of justice
for a government that insists on revoking a previously negotiated
bargain is compensation to make good all expenses arising from
reliance on the bargain 248-which, given the longevity of most of
these water rights, would be significant compensation indeed.
Properly, justice requires full market compensation for any
alterations of the bargain at the base of the property right. 249 It will
not permit uncompensated taking and the impoverishment of rights
holders as their reward for trusting the honor and veracity of their
government. If this means anything, it seems to mean that Leshy expects that the
public will be sufficiently confused by the uncompensated-takings scheme that it
will not realize what has occurred in its name in time to forbid it.
246 See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 213, at 1899 (noting
that farmers' payments
for their water rights did not cover the costs of provision, and were set lower than
were theoretically justified as part of the effort to "allur[e] ... prospective
farmers and irrigation districts"); Johnson, supra note 102, at 502 ("One reason
the water quality problem has become so serious is because water was made
available without cost to appropriators. This encouraged, and continues to
encourage, profligate use of this valuable resource .... ); Sax, Limits of Private
Rights, supra note 32, at 483 ("Western water users have benefited from a long
period of subsidy in the form of public projects to supply them with new supplies
to meet each new demand."); Sax, Constitution, supra note 16, at 278 ("[T]here
is a price paid in distributive justice, for greasing the wheels of reallocation....
That price is the concession of a windfall to the least efficient appropriators.").
247 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS supra note 5, § 14.01(b)(1),
at 14-7;
Glennon, supra note 213, at 1899; Thomas J. Graff & David Yardas, Reforming
Western Water Policy: Markets and Regulation, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T.
165 (1998) (detailing the bargain).
248 See supra text accompanying note
89.
249 See generally Cohen, supra note 46, at 261-62.
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governments.2 5 °
In a similar vein, the amounts of money that federal and state

governments currently spend on operation and maintenance of
water-delivery facilities 2 1 do not justify taking water rights (be
they of property or contract) without compensation.
The
government elects to bear those operation and maintenance costs;

it may elect to forgo them. If it does, then this savings will provide
a ready-made pool of funds to compensate rights holders for any
rights lost as a result. Such are the mechanisms of eminent
domain: the government may act; the government must pay.
Justice requires both sides of that equation.252

No justification arises, either, from the prospective difficulty
in establishing the necessary amount of just compensation due for
water-right takings.253 In fact, the idea turns standard American

notions of justice on their heads. When dealing with constitutional
rights, the Court has instructed, government functions may be
proscribed, or burdens on government occasioned, in order to
ensure that constitutional rights are not circumscribed. 4 Here, in
250

Similarly improvident are suggestions that the whole class of water rights

may be stripped of takings compensation protection because some rights may
long ago have been obtained by or to benefit fraud. Cf Glennon, supra note 213,
at 1899. An entire class of fights may not be extinguished because some right
holders may have gained them fraudulently: the implications for citizenship,
voting rights, criminal-defense rights, and others are appalling, and illustrate the
fallacy of the notion. Individual acts of fraud must be addressed by actions to
revoke the associated water rights (and perhaps to pursue criminal sanctions)
within the statutory period for pursuing such actions.
Later property
expropriation based on asserted but untested claims of misfeasance would violate
fundamental tenants of civil and criminal justice.
2. See, e.g., McCool, supra note 221, at 1905-08, 1912-16.
252 The "subsidies" argument is often part of a larger assertion that water
rights are generally held by rapacious, politically powerful agricultural concerns.
See, e.g., Leshy, supra note 36, at 2025. Even accepting the contention
arguendo, it provides no justice-based justification for uncompensated taking of
water rights. If all water-right holders have massive, nefarious political pull,
their power will ensure that no water rights are taken, mooting the point. If lessthan-all right holders are privileged, the powerful will take care of themselves,
while the non-powerful will suffer uncompensated takings. Justice does not
permit stripping rights and property only from the innocent and powerless. If
malevolent political power exists, it must be countered directly, not by
destroying a class of constitutional protection.
253 See Leshy, supra note 36, at 2006 (citing difficulty of valuing claims,
"tempt(ation] to assume that the plaintiffs water rights are valid despite the
uncertainty, in which case the government could end up compensating many
holders of defective water rights," as arguments against compensation).
254 See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
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contrast, the argument amounts to a claim that a constitutional
right should be eliminated because it would prove wearisome for
the government to respect it. This move is akin to advocating the
eradication of speech protections because some speech might
create problems for the public authorities, and some of it might go
too far.
Does justice require that the community in which a water
right has been employed exercise veto control over it at the
expense of the right holder? 255 Professor Thompson has
extensively considered the practical and theoretical problems that
undermine such a claim.256 Here it is sufficient to note that
communities enjoy and should enjoy, under eminent-domain
authority, the power to force-purchase water rights, so that all
water necessary to a community's continuity can be secured at the
If a community needs financial
community's discretion.
assistance, it can apply to state or federal authorities. But it cannot
in justice violate citizens' constitutional rights to achieve its
community interests; nor could it ever be expected that such
"community interests" would be coherent, constrained, or
extricable from competing community interests if they could be
funded "for free" by the violation of individual rights.
In fact, to the extent that communities and community
interests are considered, those interests support compensable water
rights. Making the issue of compensation payment central to the
struggle for an improved environment serves no long-term
purpose, and has the primary social effect of setting
environmentalists and property holders at odds, with property
holders (rightly, given the content of the compensation-denying
efforts) fearing that environmental advances will necessarily come
at the expense of their well-being and prosperity (rather than that

U.S. 105, 115 (1991) ("A statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First
Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the content
of their speech."); Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 467-68 (1961)
(describing burdens on governmental conduct arising from presumption of
innocence in criminal proceedings).
25 See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Understanding Transfers: Community Rights and
the Privatization of Water, 1 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 13, 13
(1994).
236 See Thompson, supra note 226, at 367-68, 379-83; cf Glennon, supra

note 213, at 1878-79 (discussing economic benefits running to communities
from dam removal).
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of the general public or of environmentalists themselves).257 Some
leaders of the environmentalist movement have recognized that
creating this dynamic will only propagate injustice and retard
ecologically beneficial efforts.258
Where the threat of
expropriation is removed, voluntary cooperation and interaction
between environmental and property interests can flourish to the
benefit of both.25 9
IV. ECOLOGICAL-USES WATER TRUSTS

Water rights are real and are constitutionally subject to justcompensation protections when taken. No doctrine, maxim, or
other source of law, ancient or modem, can coherently or
legitimately challenge this fact. Nor would it be wise, just, or
justified to deny compensation in aid of environmental protection
even if such a move were possible. This recognition leads to the
challenge of finding a reform agenda that accepts and attempts to
take advantage of compensation-protected water rights while
advancing legitimate environmental-protection interests. While
explicating a comprehensive agenda--one that would deal fully
with such important issues as junior rights, groundwater rights, and
myriad related issues-is beyond the scope of this article, a modest
outline of suggested reform follows.
First, states must explicitly reject the compensation-denying
approach. No good can come from retaining the rhetorical
position, but much ill: so long as the threat of uncompensated
takings shadows rights holders, it will discourage investments in
water-conserving, waste-reducing, and efficiency-enhancing
technologies. It will hamper environmental-protection proponents'
157 See, e.g., James W. Ely, Jr., Property Rights and Environmental
Regulation: The Casefor Compensation, 28 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 51 (2004)
(describing such effects).
258 See, e.g., Frazier, supra note 219 passim.
259 See, e.g., Bonnie G. Colby & Tamra Pearson d'Estr6e, EvaluatingMarket

Transactions, Litigation, and Regulation as Tools for Implementing
Environmental Restoration,42 ARIZ. L. REV. 381 passim (2000); Ely, supra note

257. Colby asserts that some "compulsion" is necessary to "requir[e]
landowners and water users to assist in restoration" and "to come to the
negotiating table." Colby & d'Estr6e, supra, at 385-86. But eminent-domain
authority (designedly) provides the spur to negotiation and the trump against
holdouts. It thus provides as much potential compulsion as is required. Cf
Thompson, supra note 226, at 372-74 (recognizing that compensation-denying
strategies have not resulted in much actual progress, supporting need for respect
for property rights to achieve environmental ends).
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needed recognition that environmental good, like other goods,
must be paid for. 260 And it will continue to dampen the spirit of
ecological-value-regarding inmovation and generosity that has been
shown to animate rights holders when not threatened with
expropriation. 261
Next, states should incorporate, as some already have,2 62
environmental-impact review of future water-right applications
(including applications by municipal water systems), to determine
ex ante whether the state can "afford" to sell or grant the water
rights, or whether instead the rights must be set aside for
ecological uses-recognizing that once the rights have been
granted, they will have to be bought back or foregone. Further,
laggard states that have not yet fully recognized in-stream uses as
beneficial should do so, thus fully clearing the way for purchase
and ownership of water rights dedicated to such use.
To make rights more fully alienable, water markets more
efficient, and the cost of procuring water more reflective of actual
fluctuating value and scarcity, states should liberalize the laws
applying to water rights, permitting rights holders to negotiate for
elimination of restrictions on alienation. 263 Oregon made an effort
along these lines in the 1980s, but without notable success in
260 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 226, at 374 n.53 ("The public ...might

balk at paying for a good (e.g., instream flows) to which it believes it already has
a right.").
265See, e.g., Ely, supra note 257.
262See, e.g., Douglas L. Grant, Two Models of Public Interest Review of
Water Allocation in the West, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 485, 488-89 (2006)
(discussing review options and needs).
263 Meaningful reform would require concentrating all of the relevant
alienation-negotiation authority in some set of hands, be it water districts or
users, with proper protection and/or compensation for the dis-intermediated
parties, to the extent of their valid property or contract interests. See, e.g., 2
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS supra note 5, §§ 14.01(b)(2), 14.02. Similarly,
junior users with valid claims that are lost because seniors have alienated the
relevant water flow will require compensation for the actual right that the juniors
have lost. Whether the state or the senior would provide that compensation
would depend on the terms agreed between the state and the senior, and the
junior's role in negotiations. Cf Colorado Springs v. Yust, 249 P.2d 151 (Colo.
1952); Tanner v. Humphreys, 48 P.2d 484 (Utah 1935) (permitting senior
appropriator to alienate water upon mitigation to protect valid junior rights). It
would also require decreasing, so far as possible, administrative hurdles to
smooth market function. See, e.g., 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 5,
§§ 14.01(b)(2), 14.02, 14.04(b), 14.04(d)(3). Some states have begun efforts in
that direction. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-223; MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2402 (1979); WATER CODE § 11.002(4).
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tempting water right holders to purchase expanded rights. 26 The
Oregon statute demonstrated some notable flaws, however. Most
importantly, it did not allow the final cost of right liberalization to
be set by negotiation, but rather set a default of 25 percent of the
pre-liberalization water right-a figure that, as experience proved,
was too high to entice right holders.2 65 Additionally, Oregon's act
did nothing to reassure right holders that the water they retained
266
would not be taken by various compensation-denying measures,
thus discouraging investment in conservation technologies
generally. A later effort by Washington State rectified one of these
problems by allowing negotiation between the state and right
holders, but the initiative was restricted merely to trading state
funds for conservation measures for delivery to the state of the
right to some or all of the conserved water, thus needlessly limiting
available options and constraining opportunities for mutually
beneficial exchange.2 67 These new statutes should allow open
bargaining between right holders and the state for Purposes of right
liberalization, and should permit payment for such liberalization in
either water or cash.
States and the federal government 268 should establish
264 See OR. REV, STAT. §§ 537.455-.500 (2007); Thompson, supra note 226,

at 378-79.
265 Harbison, supra note 144, at 561; Thompson, supra note 226, at 278-79.
266 In fact, Sax praised Oregon's continuing ability to expropriate water after
the statute's enactment, and urged it to keep such options available. See Sax,
Constitution, supra note 16, at 277-78. Sax suggested that "waste enforcement
may be needed even to induce 'voluntary' conservation and sale," id., but this
misstates the situation. Rather, the background threat of compensation-denial
plus an excessive price for liberalizing property rights will deter investment in
water-conserving technologies that would free water for transfer, and will make
the transfer economically unattractive.
267 See generally WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.42 (West 2004).
268 If the federal government wishes to enforce environmental mandates that
require taking water rights (instead of merely regulating the use of water rights,
see supra Part I.E.2 (distinguishing takings from regulations), then the federal
government, rather than the states or private individuals, should pay the
compensation.
Establishment of a federal EUWT would go far toward
internalizing some of the costs of federal environmental protection, and reduce
the unfunded mandates at the heart of these programs. This would alleviate in
part some of the imbalances that make federal environmental law so problematic
in many western jurisdictions (e.g., high number of specialized and endangered
species in West, additional relative importance of water necessarily dedicated to
environmental uses, etc.). See, e.g., Bruce Babbitt, The Public Interest in
Western Water, 23 ENVTL. L. 933, 939-40 (1993) (detailing process by which
minor species arose in the West because of limited, discrete water supplies).
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ecological use water trusts (EUWTs). These quasi-public trusts
would serve as the repository of water rights reserved or procured
for ecological uses. Transferring such water rights to these trusts
would remove them from the general pool of water available for
non-ecological uses and place them beyond the reach of grasping
municipal and other uses as scarcity increases. EUWT rights, like
private rights, would enjoy taking-compensation protection, and
thus would not be available for majoritarian commandeering (as a
means of avoiding market-price payment for water).269 As a
consequence, ecological uses would be protected, while nonecological use water prices would take into account the scarcity
appropriate to the entire available pool of water less EUWT water.
The EUWTs or coordinate agencies should manage the
ecological uses of waters as well. The responsible organization
should be provided with the power to negotiate with right holders
for the liberalization described above, and to collect the proceeds
of these transactions; to buy and sell water rights (including
conservation easements or other efficiently contoured rights 270 )
with regard to the maximization of efficient ecological use of
available EUWT resources; to condemn and pay for EUWT waters
where necessary; and to assign water rights for ecological
purposes. This would introduce pricing, and thus efficiency, into
the evaluation of potential ecological uses. The trust management
would employ cost metrics and pricing discipline to evaluate the
best available uses for the available stocks of reserved water, and
would have incentives to assign waters to proposed projects that
made efficient and careful use of trust waters, getting the most
environmental value per unit of water. The incentive would also
Where Bureau of Reclamation contracts between states and the federal
government transferred water interests to the federal government in exchange for
undertaking various engineering processes, then such contracts may mitigate
federal obligations, but may also create alternative obligations in the federal
government (such as continued maintenance of the facilities) derogation from
which would itself require compensation.
269 Washington State has created a "trust water rights program," but it
includes, largely without differentiation, water procured for all beneficial
purposes (including municipal uses), and permits trust-water release for all such
purposes. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN.-§§ 90.42.005(2)(b), .005(2)(d), .030(1)
(West 2004). Reservations are only possible for in-stream uses, and only at the
instigation of the conveyor. See id. at § 90.42.080.
270 See, e.g., Mary Ann King & Sally K. Fairfax, Beyond Bucks and Acres.
Land Acquisition and Water, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1941, 1982 (2005) (referring to
conservation easements).
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arise for the trust to negotiate wisely with right holders (or,
alternatively, wisely to select water for eminent-domain
condemnation) to secure the most cost-effective supplies of water
to achieve ecological purposes, rather than employing inefficient,
over-protective, and therefore highly expensive standards.27'
Funding to secure ecological-use waters could come from a
variety of sources. A primary source would be the treasury.
General funds, though, could be supplemented in a number of
ways that have been alluded to above. Funds (or in-kind water
stocks) would be generated from right-liberalization agreements
with water-right holders; these revenues could then be dedicated to
ecological-water purchases or uses. Savings-in the form of
unspent operation, management, and related fees-could be
generated by de-commissioning particularly inefficient or
environmentally problematic water-control facilities.2 72 These
should likewise be reserved: first, for the payment of compensation
to any whose property or contract rights in water were injured by
the de-commissioning decision; second, for EUWT purposes.
Savings could also arise from slashing production and price
subsidies to inefficient and water-intensive agricultural
production.273 The savings could go to EUWT purposes, while
reducing the subsidies would by itself release water from
inefficient current uses by eliminating the reward for such use. All
of these sources of revenue can greatly reduce the cost to the fisc
of doing justice to property-rights holders while benefiting
ecological interests.
Establishment of EUWTs will also allow for easier
coordination, cooperation, and cross-subsidization between
governments and private or subsidiary-government interests.
Private individuals, non-profit organizations, and local
governments could all offer dedicated subsidies for favored EUWT
projects, secure that their contribution would remain restrictedwhether within the general EUWT or by establishment of
271See supra note 243 and accompanying text. See also Sax, Reportorial
Fragment,supra note 127, at 2378 ("The core of today's environmental law....

has no relatively clear objective limits.").
272

See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 213, at 1878-79, 1899; McCool, supra note

221, at 1905-06, 1912-16 (recounting subsidies and operations and maintenance
expenses, and observing that "America does not have a water crisis; it has a
subsidized agriculture crisis").
273

Supra note 272.
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individual trusts dedicated to the specific purpose at hand. EUWT
managers could also stimulate such investment by offering
matching-fund opportunities to communities and private interests.
This flexibility would allow general EUWT resources to be put to
maximum beneficial ecological use.274
CONCLUSION

Western water rights do not hold any higher position than
other property rights, but neither do they occupy an inferior
position. Eminent domain likewise enjoys the same stature and
authority as other constitutional protections. Neither any public
trust doctrine nor any other constitutional, statutory, or commonlaw provision works to rob water property rights of their
constitutional eminent-domain protections. Regulation of water
rights is permissible; takings of water rights are properly analyzed
under the physical-takings methodology.
Environmental interests are not endangered by the solidity
and compensation-protection of western water rights. In fact,
ecological interests will be preserved and advanced by making
peace with, and then looking to take advantage of and even to
strengthen, western water regimes and private rights in water.

274 See, e.g., Benson, supra note 235, at 36, 67 (discussing need for
states to
recognize private in-stream rights); King & Fairfax, supra note 270, at 1982
(describing difficulties of securing dedicated water rights under current regimes);
Klein, supra note 1, at 378 (same).
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